Burns told Manmohan Singh that the US had come “as far as it could” on the agreement but “gaps” still remained. Singh let it be known that he had reached an understanding with the US president and it was for Burns to bridge the gaps. India had made it clear that this was a “two-way process”, indicating that it could even walk out of the deal if the US refused to show flexibility.

It was during this visit that National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan first offered a dedicated and safeguarded national facility to store foreign-origin spent fuel. Contrary to popular perception, the idea actually came from the Department of Atomic Energy that sought to break the impasse. A DAE representative confirmed that this could be done as a measure of confidence.

Despite this, the agreement hung in the balance until the pull-aside meeting between Singh and Bush in Germany, where the US president expressed surprise when told about the issues blocking the deal. He asked NSA Stephen Hadley to sort out the differences internally after talks with Narayanan.

In many ways, Bush’s intervention delivered the agreement. Interestingly, many feel it could all have been deliberately set up by Burns and company for the US president to magnanimously bridge the final gap. A more accurate understanding would be that there is institutional resistance from the US bureaucracy, trained as it is not to deviate from the NPT and the order that flows from it. The US has gained tremendously from the order, and to make an exception for India is a decision many in Washington still find hard to accept.

... contd.