
Given the vastly improved relations with Islamabad over the last three years and the UPA government’s delicate negotiations with President Pervez Musharraf on Kashmir, India’s current silence on Pakistan seems golden. Diplomatic silence does not mean New Delhi is not looking at different political scenarios for Pakistan in what promises to be an eventful 2007. That Musharraf’s political stock should begin to crumble at home just when big bilateral breakthroughs appeared to be at hand, is part of an unending tragedy of Indo-Pak relations.
Bhutto, herself, is aware of one such moment which was lost in the late 1980s. Two youthful prime ministers of India and Pakistan, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir, did seem to possess the will to overturn the conventional wisdom on Indo-Pak relations. They negotiated an end to the deadlock in Siachen, and looked at Kashmir with a fresh perspective. Before they could implement their ideas, the two leaders were ousted from power.
For the present though, Bhutto is aware of the current Indian political investment in Musharraf. Speaking to NDTV a few days ago, she asked “the people of India, who think that General Musharraf is the best man to do business with, to review that stance because stability in South Asia can come not only when there is democracy in India and Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan.”
Bhutto also focused on the shared interests in the region against terrorism and religious extremism. “When there are militant camps and Taliban is regrouping in Pakistan, it not only has consequences for India and Afghanistan... but also for the people of Pakistan”.
“We the people of Pakistan have a stake in dismantling the militant groups and eliminating the Taliban from the tribal areas of Pakistan so that our people can be safe from suicide bombers. (We) cannot be held hostage by militant groups who can, for example, strike India in the Parliament and bring the two countries to war”.
For India, however, it is not a question of choosing between Musharraf and Bhutto. India has no reason to personalise the current troubles in Pakistan. It should be focused on positive political outcomes across the western border.
Bhutto is of interest to India because she is trying to address the twin crises in Pakistan from a liberal platform. One crisis, on this side of the Indus river in Pakistan, being highlighted by the black coats in Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi is about the fading legitimacy of the army rule. Pakistan’s other crisis, in the trans-Indus territories, is the loss of state control to Islamic militancy. The pitched battles these days between the army and the militants in Waziristan tells only a part of the story. The militants are challenging the writ of the Pakistani state, not just in the tribal areas but also in the settled areas of North Western Frontier Province.
Bhutto emphasises not only a return to democracy but also a coalition of the modernist forces to defeat the growing extremism in Pakistan. And that the second cannot succeed without the first. Bhutto, however, recognises the tension between these two objectives.
A focus on democracy alone could result in the religious parties hijacking the popular protests against Musharraf. An exclusive emphasis on political moderation gives a free hand to the army.
As Pakistan struggles to find a new direction for itself, there is no difficulty in laying out India’s own enduring interests across the border — a democratic and modern Pakistan that is in harmony with its neighbours. In the real world, Indian diplomacy should be tempered by one sobering thought — we do not have the power to “define” the internal politics of Pakistan.
New Delhi can, however, “contribute” to the positive evolution of Pakistan in four ways: A reassurance that India will not meddle in Pakistan’s internal affairs; a reaffirmation of the commitment to find an early solution to the Kashmir question, irrespective of who rules Islamabad; an offer to work with Pakistan and Afghanistan in stabilising the north western parts of the subcontinent, and an openness to engage with all the political forces in Pakistan.
The writer is a professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore