“Of course, soft power is not the solution to all problems,” he added, saying that hard power is necessary in expelling sponsors of terrorism, or dealing with state leaders such as Kim Jong-Il. India — unlike the United States, which has a global military presence — relies on its hard power almost exclusively for defensive purposes, times when its actions can be deemed justified and legitimate by its populace and the international community.

There have, in fact, been only four cases of India’s using unilateral military force in an offensive manner: in the years following independence, when several princely states were incorporated into the republic; during the 1971 liberation of Bangladesh, which followed a massive exodus of refugees; during the IPKF intervention in Sri Lanka; and in the Maldives, when a commando force reversed a coup against the Gayoom government in 1988. The first two were under unique circumstances. The latter two matched a period of rare Indian aggression in its dealings with regional states. All of these episodes preceded the overt nuclearisation of the subcontinent.

Today, India’s default policy options, given its restraints and its regional context, are heavily reliant on soft power. Despite some interpretations, this is in fact more a gift than a curse. India’s continuing rise is not feared, and is even encouraged by some other international powers. This stands in stark contrast to China, whose rise is a cause of concern for countries as varied as the United States, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, Australia and India. Nor — aside from a short period following its 1998 nuclear tests — has India been marginalised by the international community for its foreign policy.

... contd.