Opinion Indira Gandhi’s leftward swing

By the time she left for Cairo on the first leg of her journey,what was said to be a mere statement had morphed into an “Indian initiative” to bring peace to war-ravaged Vietnam. However,the proposals in it were vague enough not to cause any offence to Washington. But,as the three-nation mission progressed,her “initiative” became sharper until,in Moscow,she signed a joint statement with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that not only called for an “immediate and unconditional” end to the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong but also condemned the “imperialist aggression in Vietnam”.

Washington’s reaction was instant and indignant. The Vietnam War was almost sacrosanct to then President Lyndon Johnson. He frowned at even minor criticism of it. Yet,the extent of his fury with Indira and India far exceeded anything New Delhi had expected. He retaliated at once and put the desperately needed wheat supplies on a very short leash. His strict instructions were that no shipment should be sent without his personal authorisation,which was always late in coming.

Consequently,India literally almost lived from “ship to mouth”,and those of us who lived through that era swallowed a measure of humiliation with every morsel of American food. Many started demanding that India should refuse American wheat,in response to which Indira Gandhi remained stoically silent publicly,but privately said that if food supplies stopped,the “agitating ladies and gentlemen won’t suffer but millions of poor people would starve”.

Sensitive Americans were as appalled as Indians by Johnson’s handling of food supplies to India and appealed to him to show some compassion,but to no avail. Chester Bowles,then US ambassador to India,ventured to point out to his president that what Indira Gandhi was saying was no different from what the UN secretary-general,U. Thant,and the pope were also saying. The irascible Texan in the White House growled at him: “U. Thant and the pope don’t want our wheat.”

Luckily,after two years of savage drought,rains were plentiful and the food problem eased. But there was no end to Indira Gandhi’s woes. In November,protagonists of a complete ban on cow-slaughter,with an eye to the approaching elections,started a virulent agitation in support of their demand. A procession spearheaded by hundreds of sadhus that,in accordance with the practice those days,was allowed to go right up to the doorstep of Parliament caused such mayhem that police firing became necessary and six persons were killed.

Indira Gandhi’s decision to suppress the agitation was implemented easily enough but what followed was acutely embarrassing,indeed mortifying,to her. She had wanted to use the mayhem to ease out her home minister,G.L. Nanda,who was not only ineffectual but also sadhu-loving to such an extent as to formally head the “Sadhu Samaj”. In fact,she had wanted to divest Nanda of the home portfolio even while forming her first cabinet in January. But she was advised that the man had been temporary prime minister twice,after the deaths of Nehru and Shastri,and should be left alone. In November,however,she wasn’t prepared to heed this argument. Nanda had to go,flailing his skinny arms and protesting that he was being made a “scapegoat”.

Together with Nanda’s ouster,Indira Gandhi had also planned to replace finance minister Sachin Chaudhuri and commerce minister Manubhai Shah. But,to her consternation,the Syndicate,still headed by Congress president Kamaraj,summarily vetoed this. The country thus knew how limited the prime minister’s powers were,and who really called the shots. Worse was yet to follow.

In December,the Congress Parliamentary Board started choosing Congress candidates for the general election due in February-March 1967. Soon enough,Indira Gandhi discovered to her dismay that the Syndicate was giving her little say in the choice of candidates. She was alarmed because how could she be sure of her continuance as PM if a sufficient number of her supporters were not included in the list. Her humiliation was acute when,despite her repeated plea that Krishna Menon be given the party ticket in his traditional constituency,the Syndicate refused to do so. Surprisingly,even her plea that a decision on Menon be postponed by a few days was brushed aside. She had no option but to pocket the rebuff.

Menon did not. He resigned from the Congress and fought the election as an independent candidate but lost. Like him,a fairly large number of Congressmen whose claims were disregarded because the party bosses did not like them voted with their feet and left the party. Some of them joined opposition parties that were delighted at the thought that the Congress was embarked on a self-destruction course. Indira Gandhi kept her counsel but in a personal letter to P.N. Haksar,still deputy high commissioner in London,gave vent to her feelings.

No wonder,by this time word went around the country that there was no certainty that Indira Gandhi would be PM after the 1967 polls. It was obvious that the Syndicate was totally opposed to her and was likely to make common cause with Morarji Desai,who was proclaiming loudly that he would again challenge her leadership because he did not want to be “cheated out” of what was his due a third time.

It was against this backdrop that on Christmas Day Indira Gandhi gave the public the first glimpse of her strategy to turn the tables on those confident of removing her from office after the polls. “Here is a question,” she told the press,“of whom the party wants and whom the people want. My position among the people is uncontested.”

The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator