The NE has emphasised that the rights and duties of the parties must be read in the light of the evolving state of the art since the treaty was signed in 1960. The overriding criteria must be “the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system” in a spirit of “cooperation, goodwill and friendship”, taking into account “the most economical design”, the “best and latest practices in the field of construction and operation”, safety factors, and the protection of live storage against sedimentation in the interest of “sustainability”, which must necessarily include “draw down sluicing and flushing” and advance action in view of the uncertainties of looming climate change.

Lafitte examined world experience and noted that the Warsak Dam on the Kabul river in Pakistan and Salal in J&K on the Chenab below Baglihar had been rendered ineffective by heavy silting, the latter resulting from an injudicious concession made to Pakistan. Islamabad’s objection to Baglihar has been that its allegedly oversized pondage, gated spillway and under sluices enable India strategically to dry up or flood the Chenab to military advantage. The same argument was used to block Salal.

Lafitte has firmly rejected Pakistan’s desired reduction of the Baglihar pondage from 37 million cu m to 6.22 m cu m to convert the project from a peaking to a “constant (base) load” station, thus defeating both purpose and viability. However, he has marginally reduced the project’s designed pondage based on a different calculus.

Pakistan’s fears are bizarre. Baglihar is 110 km from the international boundary and any sudden impounding of waters would first hurt Indian villages. Pakistan would be far less affected, if at all, because the geometry of the valley would cause progressive dissipation and attenuation of the flood.

... contd.