The moot question is: has he? And if yes, how will this affect the internal power dynamics in Pakistan and by extension, what implications does this have for India?

Over the last six decades the military has gradually subsumed the state itself and the attendant levers of power. Beginning with Field Marshal Ayub Khan and later with General Zia, who began the gradual process of Islamising his rule, the military has not only emerged as the principal power centre but has also struck a Faustian bargain with right-wing extremist groups. Covert and overt support to religious zealotry and jihadi violence has been the leit-motif and integral to the military GHQ’s external policies. By extension, both Afghanistan and India have been differently identified over the last 25 years to gain strategic depth and inflict strategic bleeding, respectively. And Musharraf has been a prominent player in this larger Pakistani strategy right since his days as an ambitious, assertive brigadier to his 1999 Kargil adventure as a four-star general.

In the last seven years of his rule, he has consolidated the power of the military in the country’s internal structure but must be given due credit for steering the ship of state with a great efficiency in the post 9/11 turbulence. His fine balance of running with the (US) hound in prosecuting the GWOT, even while providing slack to the jihadi hare seemed to be successful — till the recent Dick Cheney visit. In the last month, the deteriorating security situation on the Pak-Afghan border and the ire in Washington over Pakistan’s duplicity have come to a boil. Consequently, the US pressure on Pakistan to do more in apprehending various terrorist groups and known leaders is increasing.

... contd.