The third issue is going to be one of state capacity. It is no secret that Bihar’s state capacity had been systematically decimated over the past two decades, and the recent turnaround in rebuilding is still tenuous. For most Indian states we do not have a systematic mapping of whether the state’s capacities match the frontline functions it is supposed to perform: how many engineers or health workers we have, what capacities they bring and so forth. Only in a disaster is this secret revealed. Many commentators have pointed out the crucial link between corruption and the choice and quality of projects we choose to invest in. There may be a story to be told about the relationship between embankments and corruption. But we should also not delude ourselves into thinking that corruption is the only source of weakness in the state. But the second aspect of state capacity is the ability for the state to prioritise. The strongest argument for the reform of the state is not to allow the private sector. It is the recognition that a state with too many limbs flailing all over the place is not likely to be well-coordinated when it comes to basic priorities.

The fourth issue is going to be the architecture of compensation and relief. If the reports of the amount of unproductive silt and gravel the Kosi is carrying are true, then there is little doubt that this flood episode will have long-lasting effects on the productivity of the region. This is a region already at the margins of existence, and there is no doubt that large numbers of people will require not just compensation, but support to rehabilitate them in different livelihoods. There is no evidence that we have any strategy in place for this.

... contd.