
Yes, I think the armed forces are a role model. The three pillars of our strength are professionalism, secularism, and an apolitical approach. I am happy and satisfied to have handed over the baton to my very distinguished successor.
You don't grudge your counterpart the privilege of deciding when to shed his uniform?
No, I wouldn't want to comment on that (laughs).
You have this long army tradition of three generations -- grandfather, father, and then you.
We grew up on stories of World War I and World War II. I was born in 1945, the year World War II ended. My grandfather, who fought in World War I, used to tell stories at dinnertime of what he went through in the Mesopotamian campaign. He was a wounded prisoner of war, so he saw very difficult times. My father served from 1943 to 1973. He fought in World War II and used to tell us stories of what he experienced.
You had no choice (but to be commissioned).
We grew up in cantonments and some of these cantonments were really frontier outposts. Today you go to Jhansi or Babina, it's different. Those days, Babina was a little village and the army remained in the cantonment there. I studied in a missionary school. We grew up on war stories (and movies) -- To Hell and Back, A Bridge Too Far, The Guns of Navarone, Bridge on the River Kwai.
My children see them, and I'm sure their children will too.
At that time there wasn't much in the corporate world in India. I thought the army was the best career for me.
Where were you in the 1965 war?
In Nagaland, countering terrorism.
That was one time the Indian army fought when it was completely outnumbered.
They came with training and equipment from across the border and subjected us to fire. We had to make sure the very thick jungles on the Indo-Myanmar border were not used by them to sneak in. We were able to catch them in a camp. A whole lot of them surrendered in 1967, so that was a great success.
In the last three years, you were matching wits with your batch-mate of sorts, Gen Musharraf. Tell us what your experience was like with him in Kashmir. How have you seen the picture evolve?
As chief of the Indian Army, one of the finest armies in the world, my focus was on operational readiness, on training for war, on keeping the violence levels low in Kashmir and the northeast. Then there was focus on modernisation and administration. The most important determinant of success in war is the man behind the machine, who was given due attention.
But have violence levels come down? Has the casualty level come down?
Casualties include civilian figures too. There has been overall improvement in the situation. We have done fair amount of work. Some more has to be done.
What brought about this change? What did you do different tactically?
I'll give all credit to my predecessors. They continuously worked to ensure that terrorism does not succeed. Our strategy was always evolving. We continued with whatever principles or policies my predecessors had set. I added one more element -- professionalism and a no-nonsense approach as far as tackling terrorism was concerned. I also focussed on the humane face of the army. As a result, we have fewer instances of human rights violations.
You were caught in three ambushes, isn't it?
They targeted me when I was a brigade commander during the height of operations in 1991 and 1992. I was wounded once. Twice I escaped. I'm grateful to God.
Tell us about those experiences. I know you will put them down in a novel.
In one case they had laid an elaborate ambush in Baramullah to target four vehicles. Everything was in place but that ambush failed at point-blank range. It was a miraculous escape for us. I think it failed because of two or three things. One was that the commanders failed to signal the opening of fire. Second, they perhaps did not expect me to be leading that convoy that day, which I was doing with my flag and star.
They thought it could have been a decoy.
Absolutely. And that delay of a fraction of a second gave me time to take cover behind a truck. You will be surprised there was not one casualty. My Qick Reaction Team returned fire. Luckily, we all survived.
Tell us about when you got hit?
About 27 infiltrators were coming in from practically the same area where the late Col Vasant was martyred.
The colonel who was recently killed. He's from your regiment, the 9 Maratha Infantry.
The battalion, yes.
You commanded the same battalion?
I did command that battalion. The group (of infiltrators) was stopped by a brilliant captain of the Gorkhas. His observation post had seen the group of terrorists coming down. We had much less force, but this officer rushed without informing others because he knew every minute was important. He and his twelve men blocked the entry of those terrorists into a big village. If they had got into the village, they could have hidden their weapons and got away. My brigade command happened to be on the other side. I asked people what was happening and the CO said nothing was happening in our area but a captain was pinning down some terrorists. Anyway, I rushed to the scene with whatever men I could gather and we got 27 terrorists. I was hit. For any soldier to shed blood for his country is a great honour. Maharana Pratap, Rana Sangha -- they were all warriors who had battle scars they were proud of. I feel that the wound is the greatest thing I wear on my chest.
People ask me, 'How come your friend JJ spends so much time and energy on the special forces?', which got more attention during your time. I tell them he commanded the Marathas -- and all of Shivaji's doctrine was special forces, special operations.
Yes, light forces that came in from unexpected directions at unexpected times and broke contact after striking. He was very successful at irregular warfare, if I may say so. The huge monolithic army he was fighting found it couldn't match his speed.
But at times our army finds itself at the other end of the equation. It has to fight people who are nimble, who break contact quickly.
There's a saying, 'To beat a guerrilla, you have to be a guerrilla yourself.' Our training schools and pre-induction schools teach our soldiers about this.
How did you focus on the special forces? What did you do for them?
In the future we will need more and more special forces -- special forces in the real meaning of the word. Not really commandos, but those that operate behind the lines. They need very special equipment and we are on the way to getting that. Modernisation is a continuous process and I have achieved something in my tenure.
If I may say so, the Americans have been of great help.
They have some equipment and I think in a few years our special forces will be well-equipped. As it is, in performance, they are the best in the world.
I'm a student of military history and somehow the impression I've formed -- so have many others who follow military history -- is that special forces have never been used. They have just been a glorified infantry.
We know exactly what special forces should be doing and the better equipment that they need, for which I have made acquisition plans. What is also important is language training. Unless they know the language they won't be able to merge with the people.
You are a commando at heart.
Well, I've seen more bullets fly than anybody else in my batch or hierarchy. I've seen bullets and I've been able to translate that into what it means to lose life. Every life we lose is precious. I've been able to focus on this. Fortunately, we have had better infantry and commando tactics and we have been able to reduce our fatal casualty figure by one-third of what it was a few years ago.
What soldiers call 'kill ratio'.
I call it the attrition ratio. When I took over, I said, 'Please don't use that word.' I thought that was not the professional way to call it.
Did you change that consciously?
Very much. I thought we should be able to project to the people that we are there for their security in all conflict areas. I coined the phrase 'iron fist in a velvet glove'. The iron fist is for the terrorists; the velvet glove for innocents caught in a conflict zone.
It is now a well-known fact that while the Indian Army is still losing lives in Kashmir, the Pakistani army is losing many more lives on their western border, probably to the same kind of guys they had been unleashing on us.
If you go by newspaper reports, they have been taking a lot of causalities.
You have access to more than newspaper reports. And at least you are not contradicting the newspaper reports. Would you say that over the last couple of years they have suffered more casualties in their counter-terrorism than us?
If you speak of the last three years, you are right.
How does it make you feel? Maza aaya, serves you right? Or, as a soldier, do you feel for those soldiers?
Speaking from a soldier's heart, I feel no soldier should die in vain. Our soldiers have a cause and are fighting for a just cause, trying to be as professional as possible. That's why we have been able to reduce casualties. Very few armies have officer casualties. But ours has been a tradition in which officers have always led from the front.
Let's get back to the Pakistani army. Do you think these guys should have known better?
I cannot say. I'm not aware of the kind of challenge they face. I'm only saying that we focused on some fundamentals -- precise information and strategic operations.
Once you create a Frankenstein's monster, you have to deal with it. Do you have any advice for your friends in the Pakistani army?
I don't think I'm competent to give them any kind of advice.
Not professional, not on how to fight.
Well, otherwise it is the domain of the Ministry of External Affairs.
And you don't have any perverse sense of satisfaction? We've lost so many lives . . .
No, a soldier is a soldier. We have always respected foreign soldiers, even if they are our adversaries. We have even been performing last rites for terrorists who die at our hands.
How do you rate the level of activity in Kashmir now?
I can only say the level of violence has gone down considerably.
What about the quality of insurgency, militarily?
Well, that can keep going up and down.
And the mix of people you are fighting?
I feel that presently 45 per cent are outsiders and 55 per cent are our boys (Kashmiris).
Is 45 per cent high?
It's higher than before.
What is the reason?
I don't know. I feel their organisations are training them and sending them and maybe expecting more from them.
Do you sense any frustration on their part?
Yes, to some extent. People are giving them less and less support. There's a groundswell for peace.
Have you heard something (over terrorist communication lines) that you remember?
No. I suppose that is off-limits for this kind of interaction. They feel they have not been able to achieve some of the objectives their masters set them.
Right, and there is frustration.
There's going to be some questioning, some analysis. But as I say, the situation is stable and under control of the security forces. We look forward to better days.
From Kashmir to the mainstream. In modernisation, many of your programmes haven't moved -- self-propelled guns, replacement for Bofors guns, our indigenous programmes. Does this frustrate you?
No. There's been no crunch as far as finances are concerned. The government has supported us wholeheartedly. If trials are still on, it's because the trials are quite thorough.
If the system was different, could you have done more?
No, I think no army should rush into rapid modernisation. You need time to absorb high technology. Soldiers are the ones who will have to use it. Modernisation must be gradual and that's the way we are doing it.
So you are satisfied with the pace at which it is going.
I think the pace is satisfactory. In some areas we are moving fast. I am sure the armed forces will have the desired punch the country expects them to have.
I hope they do. Because I was very sad when one of your predecessors, at the height of Kargil, said we would fight with what we have. It was almost said with a sense of resignation.
I think his opinion was based on the fact that new equipment had not been forthcoming. So he said that at that time. From Kargil to today, we have improved our capabilities tremendously. For instance, in night-fighting capabilities we are moving rapidly. Our soldiers are now equipped with night lights, night-vision binoculars. We are able to carry out night evacuations of casualties by helicopter in mountainous areas.
Can they fight at night, the helicopters?
We've got certain capabilities and we'll be acquiring the capability to fight at night as well. Our tanks have Thermal Imaging Night Sights. The new generation T-90s have very good night sights.
The physical protection of troops has improved greatly. We see better helmets and body armour.
The ultimate plan is FINSAS -- the Future Infantry Soldier As a System. This will be an expensive programme. We have a blueprint.
What will the FINSAS look like?
He will be able to communicate with the next soldier, he will be aware of the battlefield. A palmtop will tell him where others are in relation to him. It will also enable him to transfer messages.
I hope our soldiers will not be weighed down, like the European and American soldiers.
No, the weight our soldier will be carrying will be evaluated carefully. It will be something manageable.
When do we see it happening?
In phases. It could take 10-15 years.
The army has had a 'booze brigadier', a 'ketchup colonel', and now a general who has been raided by the CBI. What has gone wrong in the armed forces?
I'd say we are one of the finest armies in the world, with no tolerance for anything that is incorrect. We take action wherever something has gone wrong. We are very sincere in our commitment to overcome our deficiencies.
But such incidents are embarrassing. They give the army a bad name.
In our country, our people still rate us as the No 1 organisation. They feel convinced the organisation has delivered. Issues should not be blown out of proportion.
Is there pressure because of money. Does the average soldier feel he's getting so little?
It's not that.
Are our soldiers fairly compensated?
Let me talk about suicides, which was made into a big issue. In the last four-five years, the figure has been about 100 a year. It's very sad to lose even one trained soldier. But if you analyse the cause of those suicides, it could be family problems, land problems, financial problems. We have a more responsive minister in charge of defence than ever before. We've had so many improvements.
Today a soldier is under pressure. He gets paid a very small amount of money. His children want to go to school. . .
I'll say they expect a fair and just deal and I'm sure our government will look at it favourably. Our countrymen hold us in high esteem and I'll pray to God to give us courage to continue on this righteous path and do our duty to the nation.
You've seen three years of operation, three years of peace, three years of rebuilding.
We call it no war, no peace.
Now the inevitable question: when is the time to start thinning out of Kashmir?
The border has to be guarded, as it hasn't been resolved. So there's a layer of soldiers to guard the border, a second layer to guard against infiltration. No country in the world will allow armed people to come in clandestine manner. So that deployment is necessary till infiltration stops. And the third is for a secure environment in the hinterland.
Are you saying the time to thin out has not come?
Yes.
Your military sense is that the time has not yet come?
I think so. We must not take a step in a hurry.
I know you are writing two books. The first will be fiction, you say, and the second one non-fiction. You want to put a little distance between your service and the second book. What's your view on the whole question of military history and record-keeping? We have a retired soldier writing the history of one of your wings but who has been charged under the Official Secrets Act by another organisation he was working for. How open should militaries be now to history writing?
I wouldn't like to comment on the case. But I can say one thing: a request to the defence minister that portions of our history that are not so sensitive can be brought into the public domain. It is possible for us to have some of the history written and published without carrying sensitive material.
Like all armies in democratic world do?
Yes.
We keep our secrets the longest.
I'd say there is something sensitive.
I hope that when history starts to get written, you write some of that.
There's a lot that 43 years of experience has given me. One would like to put it down so someone can benefit from it.
When you write this history, how will you describe yourself? As the first Sikh chief of army staff? Or the chief of the Maratha regiment?
I am an Indian first and an Indian last. After that I'm a Maratha, because I spent 43 years of my life with Maratha troops. And then I'm a Sikh.
On that note, all the best for your writing career. As they say, good generals should not fade away.
Thank you very much.