The Indian Air Force is now entering its 75th year and, as if to mark this event, former air chief, Anil Tipnis, finally broke his silence about what went on at the top echelons of the armed forces during the Kargil war in the summer of ‘99. Coming after the memoirs of then army chief, General V.P. Malik, and then foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, Tipnis’s observations — if they do not lead to unnecessary recriminations — could provide valuable insights into a crucial period of Indian military history.

The former air chief wrote his piece in the Force magazine. The piece can be read at two levels: as an account by an air chief of what went on, and as a personal account of experiences and perceptions of the war. The latter is a gripping human interest story which we need to remember when we expect our chiefs to act in a super-human manner. But what is far more important is the issue of India’s management and its decision-making processes during the Kargil war.

A dispassionate reading of the three accounts — those of Malik, Jaswant Singh and Tipnis (hopefully, George Fernandes will also come out with his memoirs) — one finds that there is a common thread that should reassure even the most cynical that our system of managing the higher defence of the country in a complex situation where the enemy initially had all the cards is exceptionally sound. In fact General Malik clearly writes about the perfect synergy at the political-military levels of the management of defence. The problem has been what Malik termed the fog of war. The most important lesson here is that a lot of that fog came from our prevailing mindsets.

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