Section 4(1) of the act vests the superintendence of the agency in the central government.  There is no provision in the legislation to ensure the agency will be autonomous in its functioning and not be misused. The record of the other central agency i.e. the CBI does not inspire confidence.  There is enough evidence to show that the ruling party at the Centre has often misused it to harass opponents.  An agency of this type cannot function effectively without full support and cooperation of the state governments.   Whether this agency will get cooperation from the states ruled by opposition parties is yet to be settled.

Administration of the agency vests in an officer of the rank of DGP, but the act does not prescribe a procedure that ensures the selection of the best from the police forces in the country.  The absence of such a provision is striking, because selection of the heads of police forces in the country, both at the Centre and states, has often been guided by considerations other than merit. 

Section 6 of the bill requires the state government to inform the central government about the commission of a scheduled offence.  It is for the central government to decide, firstly, whether it is a scheduled offence and, secondly, whether it is a fit case to be taken up for investigation by the agency.  Section 6 debars the state government to proceed with the investigation once the agency has been asked to do so.  Since the Centre has been given the overriding discretion to pick and choose what cases to investigate and prosecute, it creates an unwholesome concentration of power at the central level. The Centre may relegate the less glamorous investigations and prosecutions to the states.  The idea in some cases may be to show that a particular state is not capable of dealing with important matters affecting national security.

... contd.