Opinion Killing Rabbani

The assassination marks the Taliban’s capacity to strike at will against the top figures of the current regime in Afghanistan. Last July,the Taliban had killed Ahmed Wali Karzai,the half-brother of the president. In both cases,the Taliban bombers successfully breached the security of the high-profile targets,thanks to the trust reposed in them by the victims. Wali Karzai was killed by a man who was part of the family’s security detail; Rabbani was done in by a man who was trusted enough to be allowed up close. The assassin exploded the bomb hidden in his turban as Rabbani reached out to hug him. Deception has always been an important element in the Taliban’s tactical armoury.

Throughout the history of human conflict,adversaries have generally abided by the rule that mediators and negotiators will not be killed. But the Taliban and their friends in Pakistan have had little respect for that norm in Afghanistan. The Taliban gained power during 1996-97,with the support of the ISI and the Pakistan army,not so much from victories on the battlefield,but by the deception and corruption of key opposition leaders.

The political purpose of the Taliban now is to highlight the weakness of the Karzai regime,and compel the supporters of the government across the nation to switch sides.

Taliban talks

The killing of Rabbani follows the bold attack in the heavily-guarded diplomatic quarter of Kabul last week by militants who held out for 20 hours against Afghan and international forces. As the Taliban offensive gains momentum,the disarray in Kabul and Washington is likely to get worse.

Meeting Karzai on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly hours after the assassination of Rabbani,President Obama continued to emphasise the importance of national reconciliation. After all,winning over at least sections of the Taliban has been the key to Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan.

But his commander on the ground,General John Allen,declared that the Taliban are not interested in peace,only in war. The US ambassador to Kabul,Ryan Crocker,underlined the importance of inflicting some pain on the Taliban in order to bring its leaders to the negotiating table.

The non-Pashtun minorities in Afghanistan were always sceptical of the strategy of engaging the Taliban. The killing of Rabbani,a leading Tajik leader,is likely to leave them angry and explore options of their own against the prospect of Taliban’s return to power.

Haqqani network

The war of words between Washington and Rawalpindi has escalated since the Kabul siege. At the centre of the rising tensions is the Haqqani network,which has long enjoyed sanctuaries in Pakistan.

While the US has been pressing the Pakistani army chief,General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani,to act against the Haqqani network,Rawalpindi wants the group to be included in any future political arrangement in Kabul. On the face of it,it is not clear how these competing positions on the Taliban can be squared.

As the siege ended,the US defence secretary fired the first shot. He warned Pakistan that the United States will do all it can to protect its troops in Afghanistan against the Haqqani network. Soon after,the US ambassador in Pakistan,David Munter,declared on Pakistan’s state radio that there was evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistani government.

The speculation is that the US might act unilaterally against the Haqqani network,if Rawalpindi does not.

In case the Pakistan army did not get the message,Admiral Mike Mullen,outgoing chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff,delivered it personally to Kayani,and the secretary of state,Hillary Clinton,reportedly conveyed an ultimatum to Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar on the sidelines of the General Assembly.

Equally significant was the meeting that did not take place. According to reports in the Pakistani media,President Barack Obama had declined to meet Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani at the UN. This apparently led to the cancellation of Gilani’s trip.

The general reaction in Pakistan,at least in the public domain,has been one of defiance rather than contrition. The Pakistan army might be betting that the US has no option but to retreat and accept Rawalpindi’s terms for a reconciliation in Afghanistan that will include giving its proxy,the Haqqani network,the pride of place.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi