Opinion Lalu’s lesson for Mulayam

Yet,there was more at work than just Nitish’s victory. Consider the statistics: first,the swing towards Nitish-led NDA was only about 2.5 per cent. For comparison,the Congress landslide in 1984,post-Indira,was caused by a swing of about 6.5 per cent. Even with the 6.5 per cent swing — and over 49 per cent of votes — the Congress in 1984 won just about 78 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats,while Nitish bagged 86 per cent of seats in the assembly with just about 39.5 per cent of votes.

Or,consider the other recent pro-incumbency mascots. When Narendra Modi mustered more than 49 per cent votes in the 2002 and 2007 Gujarat assembly elections,the opposition got more than 25 per cent seats in the assembly; in the 2009 assembly elections,Naveen Patnaik mustered about the same votes as that of Nitish in Bihar,but still Patnaik could get only about 70 per cent of assembly seats.

The opposition in Bihar,however,was decimated (a mere 10 per cent of the assembly) despite Nitish mustering less than 40 per cent of the voteshare.

The point that needs to be underscored for those watching from UP is that the mismatch between Nitish’s vote share and the opposition’s decimation has not been adequately addressed in most of the post-verdict explanations,which take Lalu’s and the Congress’s defeat as a natural outcome of the victor’s victory.

Just as Nitish’s victory is rooted in Nitish’s politics,the opposition’s decimation must be rooted in its politics. Why was the opposition decimated when over 60 per cent votes were polled against Nitish?

The first and most obvious explanation is that it was fragmented,with Lalu-Paswan and the Congress fighting separately. But,given the Congress’s dismal performance — 221 of 243 candidates forfeiting their deposits — the fragmented opposition argument doesn’t explain enough. With Lalu-Paswan being the lone opposition,the question is: why did they fail to rally the majority of opposition votes (over 60 per cent) behind them? And the answer is simple,and instructive: exclusionary politics.

The 60 per cent votes against Nitish was not of the Muslim-Yadav-Paswan alliance alone. It was much more than them. The task for the opposition should have been to rally all of them together,instead of focussing on rallying just Muslims,Yadavs,and Paswans.

That focus makes the members of other social groups,howsoever small in proportion,feel excluded from the entire effort of opposition. The trick would have been to connect with all of them,both publicly and organisationally. This could have been possible only if the party structure was inclusive — representing all major social groups — with a general enough affinity that could rally them together.

A look at Lalu’s party structure would make his exclusionary politics very obvious. Till not very long ago,30 of 38 districts in the RJD were controlled by Muslims and Yadavs. This domination by a few specific groups of the party organisation breeds over-assertion,and results in the exclusion of natural partners even if they share the cause. That’s why,for a party espousing the cause of social justice,there was not a single “Most Backward” leader to flaunt in election rallies.

While Nitish’s effort created a perception of inclusionary politics (upper caste-most backward classes-Mahadalits),the effort of the opposition appeared an exercise in exclusion. It was this exclusionary politics that resulted in its decimation.

And that’s what the opposition elsewhere should learn — Mulayam first among them. Mulayam,who once thrived on the OBC politics that Mandal unleashed,has also shrunk himself to the exclusionary politics of a Muslim-Yadav combination. The Samajwadi Party chiefs in two-thirds of its district units are Yadavs and Muslims. Almost none of the districts is controlled by the most backward classes or by Scheduled Castes. Muslims have less control over district units than Yadavs,despite there being more Muslims than Yadavs in the electorate. This clearly excludes others and,most significantly for Mulayam’s politics,the most backward classes from his support. This,as the Samajwadi Party professes backwards-mobilisation as the organising principle of their social justice politics.

If there is little anti-incumbency mood in the electorate in UP,the opposition needs to practise some kind of inclusionary politics to keep itself afloat. Else it should be prepared to become history.

ravish.tiwari@expressindia.com