Opinion Leaks and open secrets

This does not answer the question whether Pillai’s formal disclosure of the much publicised and very well-known linkage between the ISI and LeT,two days before the Islamabad meeting,caused embarrassment to the Indian delegation and led to breakdown in the talks and whether better inter-ministerial coordination could have averted it.

In the light of the correspondence between Qureshi and the UN secretary-general just the week before the Islamabad meeting and in the light of the dossier the Indian home minister handed over,the Indian home secretary’s statement could not have taken the Pakistani foreign minister by surprise. The UN panel set up by the Security Council at the specific request of the Pakistani government to investigate the circumstances leading to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto concluded that she faced threats from a number of sources “including elements in the Pakistani establishment”(read: army and ISI). The report adds: “Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence conducted parallel investigations,gathering evidence and detaining suspects. Evidence gathered from such parallel investigations was selectively shared with the police… These officials,in part fearing intelligence agencies’ involvement,were unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions,which they knew,as professionals,they should have taken.” The commission called for Pakistan to consider establishing a “fully independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate political killings,disappearances and terrorism in recent years”. It urged the government to conduct a thorough review of intelligence agencies “based on international best practices”.

Though the report of the UN panel dealt with the murder of the most charismatic leader of the country,the chairperson of Qureshi’s party and wife of the current president of Pakistan,Qureshi was compelled to protest against the UN panel verdict. In his response,UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he fully backed the UN’s three-man committee which probed the murder,and that it carried out its work “professionally”.

Now come the WikiLeaks disclosures that the Pakistan army and ISI have been supporting terrorist organisations throughout the period 2004-2009. In this period,General Kayani was the chief of the ISI for three years and army chief for a few months short of three years. He is therefore totally identified with this policy of using terrorism as a state policy both internationally and domestically. For his success in the game of deception vis-a-vis the US,his tenure has been extended by three years by the civilian government of the party of Benazir Bhutto. The civilian government is so terrified of the army and ISI it had to protest against the UN panel’s verdict.

When the Pakistani army and ISI have been playing successfully the game of deception for years against the US,which included support to the Taliban which has been inflicting casualties on the Americans,and at the same time collecting the American taxpayers’ money in billions for pretending to fight terrorism,they are not likely to accept any proof India may offer and concede there are links between the ISI and terrorist organisations. They are in denial even when confronted with thousands of documents,as has happened with the WikiLeaks disclosures.

It was unrealistic in the first instance to assume that Pakistan was interested in any settlement of any issue except on its own terms. Its leaders have been drunk with success for having outsmarted the Americans for years and they were playing games with India as they have been doing with the US. Therefore there is absolutely no ground to believe that,but for Pillai’s statement,there would have been a great agreement between Qureshi and Krishna.

All this does not rule out the need for better coordination among the concerned ministries dealing with various aspects of national security. The realisation of the need for such coordination brought into existence the office of the national security adviser. Those who believed in the conventional philosophy of governance in which every cabinet minister practised a “live and let live” style of governance did not welcome the NSA. It has taken more than 12 years for that office to evolve into its appropriate role of a coordinator instead of being an independent executive in the national security set-up.

But,to be effective,the coordination should be at two levels,as in the US. The first level is that of five cabinet ministers who form the National Security Council. The second level is of the five secretaries dealing with national security: the cabinet secretary and foreign,defence,home and finance secretaries. In the US NSC set-up,they have a weekly deputies’ meeting to effect coordination and thrash out the issues before they reach the NSC under the president. Most of the hard and complicated work gets done initially at this level. Such weekly meetings sensitise key officials to issues of national security in a holistic manner and make them a coherent team. The Indian NSA should give thought to institutionalising a weekly meeting at the level of the five concerned secretaries. That would improve the coordination among the five national security ministries.

The writer is a senior defence analyst

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