Coalition politics in India has been a confounding experience. The Congress party provided stable one-party rule by being all things to all people. It then gave in to the politics of personality, which demanded ideological homogenising and individual aggrandisement at the cost of plurality of leadership. The 1977-1980 period saw an unsuccessful experiment with an umbrella coalition of the ‘Janata’ kind, with every constituent working at cross-purposes even though they had come together with a common objective and understanding.

The 1990s will be remembered for the experimentation with the phenomenon of outside support — giving the outside supporter power and influence, but not responsibility. The Congress Party, which invented the ‘outside support’ formula, pulled down the Janata Party government by luring away and deceiving a gullible Charan Singh in 1979. It played the same game again in 1990 to pull down V.P. Singh’s National Front government by flirting with Chandrashekhar. In each case, the outside supporter was bigger than the ruling coalition. This was repeated again in 1996-98, when the Congress supported the United Democratic Front governments of H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral. The Left has now borrowed that model. It takes advantage of its ‘outside support’ to the UPA to consolidate itself by asserting its veto on a variety of issues.

Coalition politics at the turn of the century looked mature, despite the Congress still dreaming of governing India on its own. The NDA remained well-set despite minor aberrations, because the BJP’s sphere of support and geographical spread was limited. The BJP willy-nilly accepted its regional partners’ spheres of influence and was modest about promoting its interests.

The Congress-led alliance too faces strong limitations. The Congress remains the only national party with the ambition to regain its lost space of one-party domination. Therefore, both at the national and state levels, its interests clash with those of its coalition partners. Not quite adept at sharing the fruits of power, the party annoyed its partners when it cornered most of the gubernatorial and other positions.

The Left’s ambition to establish itself beyond its three citadels is already in evidence. It also has a larger-than-life self-image. It is not surprising that as soon as the young brigade led by Prakash Karat and Sitaram Yechury took over the reins of the party, they unambiguously expressed expansion plans for the party. They also violated each of the three coalition norms mentioned above in going eloquently public in their opposition to several of the government policies. In certain cases, they even took to streets. Obviously, operating in the ruling coalition from the ‘opposition’ space has been a well-thought-out policy of the Left, with the confidence that even if they keep rocking the boat, the Congress will keep sailing cautiously in order to remain in power.

The Congress, for its part, has been circumspect with the Left. It has been careful not to rub the Left up the wrong way on West Bengal politics even though it has a stake in regaining the state. Even on Nandigram, it did not criticise the Bengal government’s handling of the issue. The party also gave in to the Left’s pressure on the selection of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. It is not surprising, therefore, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was driven to taking on the Left over the nuclear deal.

With the general election less than two years away, unsettling the UPA would not help the Left. It is not strong enough to come to power on its own and is unlikely to improve its current tally of seats in the Lok Sabha. Its alliance options also appear limited. Under these circumstances it may have to arrive at an unstated compromise with the Congress to keep the UPA going — for the moment at least. But this certainly does not mean that it has learnt the coalition dharma.

The writer is director, Centre for Public Affairs, Noida