Opinion Lessons for the Lokpal

The Korean ACRC,whose mandate only covers the executive branch,focuses on preventive and educational measures. It is charged with developing anti-corruption policies,codes of conduct,reforming the legal and institutional framework,evaluating ministries and public sector organisations,monitoring corruption and protecting whistleblowers. The commission does not directly investigate cases of corruption but receives complaints and directs these to the relevant agencies. Its flagship product,an annual integrity assessment for key organisations and ministries,is based on surveys of users and employees and an evaluation of management response to survey results. Action plans are developed based on these assessments and their implementation monitored. Organisation ratings along with survey results are made public,creating a powerful incentive to improve performance.

The Indonesian KPK covers all branches of government except the military. Private firms are prosecuted when co-accused. The commission reviews complaints and assigns these to the police,the attorney general’s office,or other relevant agency,or it investigates these itself. In the 2004-2009 period,the commission established a 100 per cent conviction rate on 85 important cases of bribery. It successfully convicted public prosecutors,police officials,the chief election commissioner,members of parliament,cabinet members and central bank officials,eroding the sense of impunity that prevailed in the past.

There are several lessons from these cases that could help assess the Lokpal bill when it emerges from the standing committee. First,independence from the government for the agency’s budget,staffing,and policy and operational decisions is critical. The Korean and Indonesian commissions enjoy such autonomy. Giving the Lokpal constitutional status together with budgetary,policy and operational autonomy would help.

Second,the agenda for a new agency needs to be manageable. Korea’s ACRC focuses on preventive measures in the executive branch. Indonesia’s KPK has focused on enforcement,and has cherry picked the cases it wishes to pursue,leaving the rest to other agencies. This is where the Jan Lokpal bill is deeply flawed. Its mandate not only covers all 3 million-plus Central government employees (as against only Group A civil servants in the government bill),but also Parliament and the judiciary. Moreover,it includes public grievances in relation to citizens’ charters. These were two of the three conditions for Anna Hazare breaking his fast at Ramlila grounds. Yet this is a recipe for the Lokpal being buried under an avalanche of public complaints. If (s)he fails to deal with them expeditiously,(s)he will lose credibility and cynicism will set in. (When Korea merged the ombudsman function with its anti-corruption commission in 2008,public grievances quickly dominated the agency’s workload.) The compromise suggested by the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information — a separate law governing citizens’ charter-related grievances with a separate body to manage this — makes eminent sense.

The government is right to exclude the judiciary from the purview of the Lokpal. The separation of powers in the Constitution needs to be preserved. The judiciary must see the Lokpal as an ally rather than an adversary. Passage of a sound judicial accountability bill will reassure the public that the government is serious about addressing judicial corruption. It will also help ensure that the special courts that will try corruption cases have judges of the highest integrity. In Indonesia,the now decentralised national anti-corruption court was critical to the high conviction rates.

Third,a new organisation is rarely created in an institutional vacuum. The Korean ACCR does not duplicate the functions of the police and the public prosecutors,but oversees them. The Indonesian KPK has overlapping functions,but has the power to overrule those organisations,take over cases it considers not being properly investigated. This has been a source of unseemly inter-agency conflict. The Jan Lokpal bill proposes to shift the anti-corruption wing of the CBI to the Lokpal. The government bill proposes separate and potentially overlapping investigation and prosecution functions for the Lokpal. The standing committee,which is already being lobbied by the CVC and CBI,needs to ensure a clear division of labour and effective coordination mechanisms.

Fourth,establishing strong modern management systems in anti-corruption agencies is as important as getting the legal framework right. In Indonesia,processes were thought through and effective systems put in place. The KPK was exempted from civil service rules. Salaries were set way above government levels. An HR firm was competitively procured to manage a successful “Indonesia calling” recruitment campaign. The best and the brightest were recruited,including from the police and public prosecutors. A code of conduct was established. Staff was subject to a strong results focus. Similarly,ensuring sound management systems has implications for who is appointed to manage the Lokpal.

Finally,the political will to sustain support for an anti-corruption agency is typically weak. Strong vested interests are threatened and will resist change. A vigilant public and civil society strongly support the Korean and Indonesian anti-corruption agencies. Social networks in Indonesia have mobilised public opinion and are trying to resist efforts to dilute the powers of the KPK. In India,Anna Hazare’s movement has catalysed support for this agenda. But public support can dissipate or be distracted. There is no alternative to a professionally organised civil society that systematically mobilises voters in a non-partisan way and eschews the blackmail implicit in Gandhian fasts.

The writer specialises in issues of governance and development