General Jacob’s allegations, made during the course of a recent TV interview, raised the troubling question: how easily can military reputations be questioned, what kinds of facts, documents are there in the public space that will allow more discerning interlocutors to review our military history? TV interviews that demand no more of the participant than quotable quotes are not the forum for military historiography. But if the government has its way, we will never know military facts. That official approach is one reason why India is unable to produce strategic thinkers, necessarily steeped in knowledge of military history, and why all we have are the generals and their stories.

Unsurprisingly, India does not possess any post-Independence military historian of note. This is not because of a lack of academic talent but because the mandarins in South Block and at Army Headquarters are reluctant to throw open their archives to researchers. And that is indicative of a larger malaise — that post-Independence Indian military has been disdainful, fearful, and often ignorant of its own history. Thus the wars of independent India are under-studied, frequently misunderstood and the subject of unnecessary controversies.

There are four possible explanations for a lack of transparency of the Indian state on matters concerning military history. First, is the ‘personality cult’ that dominates Indian politics and, oftentimes, bureaucratic organisations. Hence, the 1962 India-China war is associated with Nehru, 1971 is considered Indira’s war and the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka are associated with Rajiv Gandhi and re-visiting these wars may tar their, and indirectly the Congress’s, legacy. While this explains the reluctance of Congress-led governments to opening the archives, it fails to explain why the NDA regime failed to do so. To understand this discrepancy, we have to look at the other three explanations.

The second explanation is a suspicion of scholars by the bureaucracy. Under the cloak of the Official Secrets Act, the Ministry of Defence and associated bureaucracies have stifled scholarship on the Indian military, alleging biases and agendas. This is a self-serving policy, as it does not open for historical scrutiny the role of politicians, bureaucrats and military personnel. The army, more so than the air force and the navy, has hurt itself by its reluctance to re-open the history books, encourage self-critical analysis and its resultant de facto “anti-intellectualism”. Hence, arguably, ever since Gen. Sundarji there have been very few strategic thinkers from the Indian Army who have a sound historical understanding of the Indian military.

The third explanation is organisational. The Ministry of Defence and the associated Service Headquarters have no experience of de-classification procedures and, when faced with scholarly attention, are more comfortable using the veil of the Official Secrecy Act. This also explains their eagerness to seek an exemption from the RTI act. Finally, bureaucracies are fearful of a loss of credibility that might come from increased scrutiny of their past actions. In other words, if they were wrong then, how can we be sure they are not wrong now?

Scholars have to take part of the blame for this. First, because research in such matters is more focused on the sensational aspects of military history rather than a balanced appraisal, with deep knowledge of military tactics and operations. Second, because universities in India are not research centres and are lacking in institutional capacity, in terms of storing and handling archival material, thus denying the military the option to initiate a de-classification process. Finally, there is a latent ‘anti-military’ bias in Indian academic circles that frowns upon military studies. Hence, India’s premier school of international studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University lacks a department of strategic studies.

As an acknowledgement of this problem perhaps, the Service headquarters have constituted the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR), at the United Service Institute, and the Indian Army has constituted a Centre for Army Lessons Learnt (CALL) at Army Training Command (ARTRAC), Shimla. However, both institutions represent half-hearted, bureaucratic and unimaginative responses to the problem. Neither of these institutions has full access to the operational archives. Hence, the list of the projects undertaken by CAFHR reflects that either they are of a pre-Independence era or they relate to ceremonial matters. Further, they lack the funding and the capacity required to attract talented and ambitious scholars to undertake research projects. Finally, they suffer from the ‘judge, jury and executioner’ syndrome. Serving and retired officers are called upon to judge their seniors and, in effect, legitimise the myths created in their organisations.

On the 40th Foundation Day Lecture at the Institute of Defence and Security Analysis (IDSA) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh complained about the ‘dearth of long-term planning’ in Indian strategic circles. Long-term planning cannot happen without a proper understanding of the past. As long as the state denies access to the proper study of military history, it is perhaps disingenuous on the prime minister’s part to make this complaint. Let the generals have their stories, but in the interests of its future, it is the right of the Indian public to get the facts.

The writer is a PhD candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC