
Gen. Jacob: The war plan that was given to us in writing was (one that concentrated on) Khu-lna and Chittagong
General Jacob’s allegations, made during the course of a recent TV interview, raised the troubling question: how easily can military reputations be questioned, what kinds of facts, documents are there in the public space that will allow more discerning interlocutors to review our military history? TV interviews that demand no more of the participant than quotable quotes are not the forum for military historiography. But if the government has its way, we will never know military facts. That official approach is one reason why India is unable to produce strategic thinkers, necessarily steeped in knowledge of military history, and why all we have are the generals and their stories.
Unsurprisingly, India does not possess any post-Independence military historian of note. This is not because of a lack of academic talent but because the mandarins in South Block and at Army Headquarters are reluctant to throw open their archives to researchers. And that is indicative of a larger malaise — that post-Independence Indian military has been disdainful, fearful, and often ignorant of its own history. Thus the wars of independent India are under-studied, frequently misunderstood and the subject of unnecessary controversies.
There are four possible explanations for a lack of transparency of the Indian state on matters concerning military history. First, is the ‘personality cult’ that dominates Indian politics and, oftentimes, bureaucratic organisations. Hence, the 1962 India-China war is associated with Nehru, 1971 is considered Indira’s war and the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka are associated with Rajiv Gandhi and re-visiting these wars may tar their, and indirectly the Congress’s, legacy. While this explains the reluctance of Congress-led governments to opening the archives, it fails to explain why the NDA regime failed to do so. To understand this discrepancy, we have to look at the other three explanations.
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