The second explanation is a suspicion of scholars by the bureaucracy. Under the cloak of the Official Secrets Act, the Ministry of Defence and associated bureaucracies have stifled scholarship on the Indian military, alleging biases and agendas. This is a self-serving policy, as it does not open for historical scrutiny the role of politicians, bureaucrats and military personnel. The army, more so than the air force and the navy, has hurt itself by its reluctance to re-open the history books, encourage self-critical analysis and its resultant de facto “anti-intellectualism”. Hence, arguably, ever since Gen. Sundarji there have been very few strategic thinkers from the Indian Army who have a sound historical understanding of the Indian military.

The third explanation is organisational. The Ministry of Defence and the associated Service Headquarters have no experience of de-classification procedures and, when faced with scholarly attention, are more comfortable using the veil of the Official Secrecy Act. This also explains their eagerness to seek an exemption from the RTI act. Finally, bureaucracies are fearful of a loss of credibility that might come from increased scrutiny of their past actions. In other words, if they were wrong then, how can we be sure they are not wrong now?

Scholars have to take part of the blame for this. First, because research in such matters is more focused on the sensational aspects of military history rather than a balanced appraisal, with deep knowledge of military tactics and operations. Second, because universities in India are not research centres and are lacking in institutional capacity, in terms of storing and handling archival material, thus denying the military the option to initiate a de-classification process. Finally, there is a latent ‘anti-military’ bias in Indian academic circles that frowns upon military studies. Hence, India’s premier school of international studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University lacks a department of strategic studies.

... contd.