Lack of knowledge in India has never come in the way of strongly held opinion, both positive and negative, on China. New Delhi’s policy towards Beijing has always been torn between romanticism (recall the old slogans, ‘Hindi Chini bhai bhai’) and a fear and loathing of China deeply etched on the Indian mind, thanks to the mythology surrounding a brief military clash in 1962.

China has fared no better. For decades, its leaders wrote off India as inconsequential and have been constantly surprised by New Delhi in recent years — its nuclear tests in 1998, and the big power diplomacy that followed, and India’s economic rejuvenation and its political rise on the world stage.

Chinese leaders, used to order, are constantly perplexed by the chaos of Indian politics. Often at a loss to figure out complexity of the bureaucratic politics in India, the Chinese establishment often mistakes noise in New Delhi for political signals. Yet the Chinese have not chosen to devote the kind of intellectual resources Beijing expends in Washington to deal with India. Immediately after the nuclear tests in May 1998, Chinese leaders had convinced itself that the BJP was hostile to Beijing and that a Congress government would be more inclined to good bilateral relations. Now the Chinese negotiators on the boundary dispute would give their right arm to see Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra back at the table.

The lack of mutual awareness has been compounded by total secrecy surrounding the boundary negotiations and the narrow basis of decision-making. Barring a small cadre of China hands in the foreign office, few in the government let alone the informed public, are aware of the basics of the boundary negotiations. The same is true in China.

... contd.