Many diplomatic challenges, too, need to be addressed in the wake of Agni III. Since the main political objective of Agni III is to acquire credible deterrence against Beijing, it would be unwise to ignore the prospect that China would modify its own nuclear posture to take into account India’s new strategic capabilities. Acquiring strategic parity with Beijing might, in retrospect, look a lot easier than managing its inevitable consequences. New Delhi’s failure to anticipate Beijing’s response after India’s first nuclear test in 1974 cost us dearly in terms of extended Chinese support to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes.

India’s China challenge after Agni III involves a hard-headed pursuit of two seemingly contradictory imperatives. As China dramatically expands its own military space capabilities, underlined most recently by its testing of an anti-satellite weapon, India needs to keep pace. For one, New Delhi should stop believing its own propaganda on disarmament in outer space. Having claimed a success with its first missile defence test late last year, New Delhi must now shed its political ambivalence about pursuing the next generation military space technologies. For another, India needs to outline a coherent national military space strategy, modernise its armed forces, and integrate them more effectively with the existing and planned space and missile assets.

As it prepares to match Chinese missile and space capabilities, India has an additional reason to more intensively engage Beijing. It is in India’s self-interest to pre-empt many possible misperceptions in Beijing. India’s relations with China have never been as good as they are today. That does not mean, India would accept a permanent strategic inferiority vis-a-vis China. Acquiring parity, however, does not imply India would want to invite renewed tensions with China. Finding that balance with China, after Agni III, is the real test for India’s national security strategy.

... contd.