The second weakness is that we are looking for silver bullets. Some heads had to roll. But the truth is that this enormous challenge will require work on so many fronts: from police to education, from rethinking geopolitics to redrafting military strategy, from engaging with politics to changing urban institutions. This kind of argument is often seen as a recipe for paralysis. But the opposite is true: it gives us all something to do (and tests how sincere we are about the problem): a simple thing like a working fire response system is a contribution to this effort, as is reform of legal services, reform of our science and R&D establishments. This is not to say that far-reaching military and law and order measures are not required. But terrorism is a different kind of war. Like all wars it requires the mobilisation of most of society, but it does so in a different way. What makes it so fearsome and insidious is that it capitalises on weakness in any part of the system; it can make its effects felt through any domain. A whole interlocking chain of institutions and support systems have to be in place to combat it, not merely police or intelligence.

The third weakness is the way in which we think of analogies. These analogies are more misleading than illuminating. For instance, we are drawing the wrong conclusions from 9/11. If there is anything we should learn it is not the bravado side of the American response. Despite Guantanamo, if anything, it was the fact that most of their domestic institutions retained deep credibility (vigilantism was not tolerated for instance) that allowed that society to pull through domestically. But their external response was a disaster. Three countries are still beleaguered by extensive violence and US objectives have still not been achieved. The global problem of terrorism has been exacerbated rather than diminished.

... contd.