Opinion Mantra without meaning

Consider the reports that the NSG has decided,at its plenary last week in The Hague,not to export uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (ENR) technologies to countries that are not parties to the NPT.

The exact formulation of the new guideline on tightening the export of ENR technologies — critical for the making of nuclear weapons — is not in the public domain.

Assuming the worst for a moment,the latest move by the NSG makes no sense either in terms of the NPT or the NSG’s objective of controlling the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies.

The NPT,the “urtext” of the nuclear fundamentalists,in whose name the new guideline has been invoked does not in fact prohibit ENR transfers to non-signatories. In effect,the new taboo applies only to three countries that are not parties to the NPT — India,Pakistan and Israel.

All three already have nuclear weapons. The guideline adds zero value to the non-proliferation regime,because India,Pakistan and Israel already have either one or both of the ENR technologies. For the nuclear brahmins,though,chanting the NPT mantra is a virtue in itself.

The ENR debate began seven years ago,when the then American president,George W. Bush,proposed banning the export of these technologies to those nations that did not have them. Bush’s proposal was simple in its conception.

It divided the world into those who had ENR technologies and those who did not. His diplomacy was about persuading those who had it from agreeing not to sell it to others who didn’t.

This practical approach of freezing the number of countries with ENR technologies was free of NPT clutter. For Bush had recognised that the NPT was part of the problem. The Bush team argued that the NPT allowed members like Iran to acquire ENR technologies in the name of civilian uses but had no power to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons and walking out of the treaty at short notice.

The ENR challenge,then,was about fixing the NPT’s structural problems by transcending it. Since it was defined in non-NPT terms and included India in the “ENR haves”,Delhi was happy to endorse the Bush proposal.

The Obama administration,however,has translated Bush’s ENR proposal into a meaningless mantra centred on the NPT and in the process thrown some mud on the biggest achievement to date in bilateral relations — the historic civil nuclear initiative.

How should India respond to the new development?

The last thing Delhi would want to do is to get into an argument with the NSG as a collective,especially when India is seeking membership of this club. Entry into this club is indeed important for India to have a say in the making of nuclear rules and stop the sanctimonious humbug of the kind that the NSG has just dished out.

The worst thing India could do is to view the NSG’s latest move in legalistic terms. India’s tradition of self-deluding rhetoric of moralpolitik and its adolescent literalism in reading international nuclear arrangements have proved rather costly for the nation over the last decades.

Delhi,instead,should see the NSG through the geopolitical lens. It could indeed benefit by following the Chinese lead in the NSG.

Recall how the nuclear fundamentalists were tongue-tied in responding to Beijing’s recent decision to sell additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan in defiance of the NSG guidelines. All the major powers had other business to do with China and were unwilling to confront Beijing’s haughty disregard for the NSG rules.

India will gain nothing by presenting itself as a plaintiff at the multilateral NSG. It has a reasonable chance to redress the ENR problem if it acts bilaterally with the nuclear big three — United States,Russia and France.

Delhi must put across a simple proposition to Washington,Moscow and Paris — “No ENR,No Reactor Deals.” India must remind all three that if they can’t keep their word,they should not expect a share in India’s nuclear pie.

The Bush administration had promised that while its extant domestic laws do not permit the export of ENR technologies to anyone,such transfers could be considered in future. Washington had also assured Delhi that it would not come in the way of other countries wanting to transfer these technologies to India.

The Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation agreement,it has been reported,has a provision for the transfer of ENR technologies. (For some strange reason,the nuclear agreements with Russia remain secrets while those with America are public.)

Similarly,French President Nicolas Sarkozy has reportedly assured Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that France will offer ENR technologies to India.

Does India have the leverage to hold the nuclear big three to their word? It is worth finding out.

After the meltdown of the Fukushima reactors in Japan earlier this year,the nuclear market is down after high expectations of rapid expansion during the last decade. Given the continuing economic downturn in the US and Europe,there is mounting pressure on both to promote exports and create jobs at home.

Other than China,India remains the biggest market for nuclear power generation in the coming decades and has the capacity to influence decision-making by major nuclear equipment producers in the world.

India must also consider cross-sector linkages by linking major arms purchases from the big three to their position on ENR transfers. As it puts the nuclear deals with the big three on hold,India must accelerate negotiations on atomic cooperation with other nuclear suppliers like South

Korea and Canada.

Put simply,Delhi has much room for assertive and productive diplomacy on the question of sensitive nuclear technology transfers if its political class and the strategic community don’t flail about like headless chicken in the wake of the latest NSG move.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi,express@expressindia.com