Now that the talks between Bhutto and Musharraf’s emissaries have stalled over these key issues, it is clear that Bhutto is not just cutting a personal deal with Musharraf.

The general, on the other hand, has been trying to “create the illusion of a deal without actually pursuing one” (as I wrote in these columns, ‘No big deal’, IE, April 11). Part of the purpose, especially of the government’s covert operatives has been to undermine Bhutto’s credentials as a democrat and to pave the way for a new IJI that challenges Musharraf but not the military-ISI.

Sharif’s entire political career has comprised of deals with the military-intelligence establishment. One cannot grudge his decision to get out of jail in 2000 as a result of a deal with the Musharraf regime, facilitated by foreign albeit friendly-to-Pakistan emissaries. But surely that should disqualify him from being painted as an unbending champion of civilian-democratic rule on the verge of leading a peoples power revolution.

The better bet for Pakistan right now is a negotiated settlement that enables both Sharif and Bhutto to return to Pakistani politics while at the same time addressing the systemic and institutional problems that have blocked Pakistan’s path to democracy.

The writer is director of Boston University’s Center for International Relations