In the midst of the 60th Independence anniversary celebrations, many may have missed a small news report on a proposal for elevating the defence secretary’s post to that of cabinet secretary rank. The issue merits closer examination, especially because the establishment has been in the grip of stasis for years, with many important issues hanging fire. Prime among these is that of the creation of a chief of defence staff (CDS), strongly recommended by a Group of Ministers (GoM) six years ago. Which makes one wonder if the Sir Humpherys are prevailing in a replay of ‘Yes Minister’ in South Block.

To briefly recapitulate, the report of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by K. Subrahmanyam in 1999, was scathing in its indictment of India’s security management system. It bemoaned that the ad hoc framework bequeathed by Ismay and Mountbatten had been allowed to survive by default for over 50 years without any allowance being made for a continuously evolving security environment. In a specific context, it commented: “India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure... The status quo is often mistakenly defended as embodying civilian ascendancy over the Armed Forces, which is not the real issue. In fact, locating the SHQ in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy.”

The KRC Report led to the formation of a GoM which, working with unusual alacrity, rendered in a matter of 14 months, a set of pertinent recommendations for “reforming the National Security System”. Among other measures, the GoM recommended constituting a CDS, who was to be the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The main function of the CDS would be to: administer the Strategic Forces, to optimise the inter-service force-planning process, to ensure the required “jointness” in the Armed Forces and integration with MoD, and above all, to be the single-point source of military advice to the GoI.

Under these circumstances, to ensure that the status of the senior-most civil servant in the MoD, the defence secretary, would remain “undiluted”, the GoM envisaged that he would be designated as the “principal adviser, defence”. The distinction between “military” and “defence” was based on the fact that the defence secretary had a wider ambit since he was, in theory, meant to oversee the functioning of the other three departments in the ministry: defence finance, defence production, and defence R&D. The new GoM formulation, according to which the defence secretary was to rank primus inter pares with the other three secretaries, was intended to “reinforce the view that this individual, irrespective of pay-scale or inter-service status, is a vital element in the higher management of defence, and should be so recognised...”

These are valid sentiments. The GoM also hoped to bring about integration of the Service HQs with MoD by change of the former’s nomenclature, and by devolution of some financial and other powers. The theory was endorsed by the Vajpayee government. The facts, however, were different. Most of the GoM’s recommendations were implemented within months, but the system choked on the single most crucial step for reforming the National Security System — the creation of a CDS. Two successive governments, in their wisdom, have baulked at this issue and it must be assumed that the time has not yet come for implementing the CDS system. Which is a great pity, but not a disaster.

Against this backdrop, one was therefore startled to see the news item stating that the parliamentary standing committee on defence had recommended the defence secretary be brought on par with the service chiefs, on the grounds that there is a lack of coordination between the MoD and Service HQs! All one can say is that if synergy is wanting in South Block, it is only for the reasons highlighted by the KRC. Those who feel the defence secretary lacks status, vis-à-vis the service chiefs, must understand that this is more than made up by his access to the defence minister. It is common knowledge that despite their being on par with the cabinet secretary, the service chiefs are kept well outside the inner circle.

India’s higher defence management is in urgent need of meaningful reform, and the process started by the KRC report must be taken to its logical conclusion. If any changes are at all contemplated in the MoD, their sole aim must be to bring the Services inside the ministry, and any alterations in the status of functionaries must be undertaken with even-handedness, preferably after a CDS has been put in place.

The writer is a former chief of naval staff and was chairman of the Chiefs of Staff