In essence, the strategy involved treating India and Pakistan — both nuclear pariahs — on their own merits. Bush mentioned this difference explicitly standing next to General Musharraf in March 2006. “We discussed a civilian nuclear program,” he revealed, “and I explained that Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. So, as we proceed forward, our strategy will take into effect those well-known differences.”

By the end of the next 28 months — during which US law was amended, a bilateral 123 Agreement was negotiated, and political opposition in New Delhi was finally overcome — Bush had evidently realised that the nuclear deal would be a significant element of his legacy as president. In late July, after the parliamentary trust vote in Delhi, Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley met with other senior US officials to discuss the nuclear deal as it entered the crucial multilateral stage. At the meeting, Bush agreed to pull out all the stops to get the deal through. Following unexpected Chinese opposition at the Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary meeting in Vienna, it reportedly took a phone call from Bush to Hu Jintao to ensure an eventual waiver.

With the nuclear deal now requiring only Congressional approval to be brought to fruition, Bush’s contribution to furthering the US-India relationship and bringing India in from the nuclear cold should be acknowledged. Perhaps now he can finally dust off and unfurl his “mission accomplished” banner without an undue sense of irony.

... contd.