What does this mean, exactly? One, that India is now technologically capable of putting indigenous, reliable, low cost, reusable launch vehicles into orbit and returning them to earth. This technology is cardinal for the success of the 2008 Chandrayan-I Moon Mission, 2012 manned space flight and 2020 Moon Landing. Two, that ISRO has catapulted us into the niche league of space powers capable of orbiting platforms for performing experiments in micro gravity conditions.

These achievements have been earned despite US denial of our request to participate in the International Space Station in 2005 and the cancellation of the agreement to provide India cryogenic technology by USSR in 1992. India is now set for critical applications in outer space on its own strength.

Viewed in the context of Chandrayaan-I, which will carry an instrumental payload to survey the moon’s surface and the December 2006 statement by K.N. Shankara, director of the ISRO Satellite Centre, that one of the prime objectives of Chandrayaan I is to study the quantum of Helium 3 available on the moon and to find ways of bringing it to earth in order to convert it into energy through fusion technology, these capabilities suggest that India intends to engage in exploring and exploiting natural resources of the moon. If so, India will run the Moon Race alongside the US, EU, Russia, China and Japan who have all taken initiatives in that direction.

Contracting states are committed to UN conventions on outer space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the umbrella. It lays down the legal foundation for human activities in outer space. The OST mandates that the exploration and use of outer space, moon and other celestial bodies must be conducted on the basis of equality for peaceful purpose in conformity with the UN Charter. National appropriation by claims of sovereignty; the deployment of nuclear or weapons of mass destruction in orbit or such installations on celestial bodies is prohibited. States bear international responsibility and liability for damage in space caused by national activities that are permitted only with due authorisation and under continuing supervision. Yet, 1967 OST is silent on the exploitation of natural resources of the moon.

Today, four decades after the 1966 Soviet Lunar 9 moon landing, global interest in lunar explorations has renewed. The eventual exploitation of the natural resources locked in the moon, asteroids and Mars capable of providing new energy sources, fuel for space missions, and construction material for permanent space base, among other applications, will make the race fierce. Such enterprises will be capital and technology intensive. Inevitably, geopolitical and strategic equations will be impacted.

An appropriate legal regime conducive to moon-related activities is needed — one that does not impose a moratorium on the exploitation of its natural resources, permits state parties and their private entities to collect, remove and use its minerals and other substances for investigation, supports moon mission bases, allows state parties the freedom to establish a negotiated international regime in respect to equitable sharing of natural resources when its exploitation is about to become feasible and grants the right to negotiate improvements.

The 1979 Moon Agreement does all that. Then why are there just eleven ratifications (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines and Uruguay) and five signatories (India France, Guatemala, Peru, and Romania)? Perhaps the reluctance to ratify is on account of a lack of understanding of the principles of Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) and to sharing benefits of the moon, celestial bodies and their natural resources embedded in the agreement.

Can the 1979 Moon Agreement serve our purpose? It can. A comprehensive understanding of the scope and application of the CHM and Sharing principles is essential. It is important to know that the agreement does not mandate ‘equal sharing’. It requires equitable sharing, the specific scope and methodology of which is to be determined by ratifying states parties at the appropriate time, subject to amendments.

Ratifying the 1979 Moon Agreement will give our moon related activities international legal sanction as distinguished from Russia, US and China which have not yet signed the agreement.

Lastly, the 1979 Moon Agreement reinforces the 1967 OST mandate of the peaceful use of outer space, the moon and celestial bodies. It prohibits threat or use of force or any other hostile act, or threat of hostile act, or the use of the moon to commit hostile acts or to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon, spacecraft, personnel in spacecraft or man-made space objects. These prohibitions are critical, particularly in view of China’s recent demonstration of ASAT capability and because of new developments in space weapons technologies. Understanding the nuances of ‘space security’, ‘peaceful uses of space’ and ‘weaponisation of space’ is urgent.

Nobody can predict how the future will unfold for nations with the moon on their minds. It is almost certain, however, that success will favour those who use well the rules of the great game.

The writer specialises in space and aviation law