While technically either side can choose to terminate the agreement, this provision particularly caters to fears that an India test can bring the curtains down on any ongoing cooperation under this agreement. Article 14.1 of the agreement jointly released today, states: “Either party shall have the right to terminate this agreement, prior to its expiration (40 years), on one year’s written notice to the other party.”

The notice will have to provide reasons for termination, which will then form the basis of consultation through a bilateral mechanism that will kick off soon after a notice is served.

The key portion for India is that consultations will consider the “relevant circumstances” leading to such a decision including “serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other states which could impact national security.”

This, sources said, seeks to address domestic concerns over India’s options if either of its nuclear neighbours, Pakistan or China, were to detonate a device. With a year at hand to go through these consultations, both sides will have the opportunity to find ways to continue cooperation through this agreement instead of terminating it.

Still, if both sides are unable to prevent termination of the agreement, US can exercise the right to require return of US-origin material. But this would also involve a long process of transporting such material in an environmentally conscious manner. This too cannot happen without coughing up compensation at “fair market value” of the goods being taken back.

That neither side intends to go this far is clear by this acknowledgement in the same Article: “The two parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations.”

Under this right, Washington can also take back fuel it has supplied, but that will not free US of its fuel supplies assurances in the March 2 Separation Plan:

“It is not the purpose of the provisions of this article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the parties under Article 5.6 (deals with US fuel supplies assurances).”

Article 5.6 underlines this US commitment of uninterrupted fuel supplies for the lifetime of Indian reactors. Further, it commits to create conditions of India to obtain “full access to the international fuel market, including continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.”

Despite this if there is a disruption, the agreement states that US and India will “jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such Russia, France and United Kingdom” to restore fuel supplies to India.

The agreement, which addresses all key concerns raised here after the adoption of the Hyde Act, also grants India the “consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in content nuclear material” transferred under this pact. Washington held out on this issue until the last round of talks where it was resolved following a White House intervention.

To avoid a Tarapur-like scenario, where the US had agreed to discuss reprocessing at a later date, this pact sets a timeframe to start consultations on arrangements for reprocessing “within six months of a request” and to conclude these talks within a year. In return, India has agreed to set up a national reprocessing facility under safeguards.

There are several cross-references to fuel assurances in the text and this commitment along with the right to reprocess is included right at the start in Article 2 which lays out the scope of cooperation.

To ensure that India’s strategic weapons programme is not affected by this pact, it is clearly stated that the agreement will be implemented in a manner “so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material.” This includes military facilities which, officials say, essentially removes all doubt.

The one negative for India is that sensitive nuclear technology relating to heavy water production and other major critical components including dual-use items that can be used for enrichment and reprocessing cannot be transferred under this pact. The agreement says this can only be done through an amendment.

While this is seen as a slight setback among nuclear scientists, the agreement would pave the way for India to explore such possibilities with other supplier nations. Moreover, US as a matter of policy, largely does not supply this technology to any country including nuclear weapon states.

Once upon a time in 1998...

When India tests its nuclear device in Pokharan, in the absence of any such agreement with the US:

N-weapons programme: Not recognized internationally, any efforts to strengthen programme attracts range of countermeasures, across-the-board sanctions.

Fuel supplies: No fuel supplier nation can trade with India. In 1992, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) adopted a rule that no country outside P-5 can have unsafeguarded reactors. And if so, NSG will not do business with such countries. Prime example: India.

Reprocessing: India does reprocess spent fuel but shortage of fuel. India cannot import fuel and even if it does, reprocessing will draw criticism. US-origin fuel still lying idle in Tarapur.

Research and Technology: India nuclear scientists find hard to travel due to visa problems, dual technology not available because India is outside the NPT system

With the 123 agreement in place...

N-Weapons programme: US doesn't recognize but agrees it will not hinder growth of the military programme. India can still test but US can respond by asking for return of all it has supplied under the agreement. However, this time there will be consultations taking into account circumstances (which means if Pak and China test)

Fuel Supplies: US agrees to let India import fuel for civilian programme and is committed to get a similar exemption from NSG. This frees up domestic fuel for weapons programme. Besides, US guarantees India uninterrupted supplies, also agrees to support building a strategic reserve.

Reprocessing: US agrees to grant advance consent to reprocess spent fuel under safeguards. This enlarges base for the second-stage programme and can prove useful to expand the civilian programme.

Research and Technology: Easier for visas to scientists, doors open for importing a range of technology denied so far

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