To avoid a Tarapur-like scenario, where the US had agreed to discuss reprocessing at a later date, this pact sets a timeframe to start consultations on arrangements for reprocessing “within six months of a request” and to conclude these talks within a year. In return, India has agreed to set up a national reprocessing facility under safeguards.

There are several cross-references to fuel assurances in the text and this commitment along with the right to reprocess is included right at the start in Article 2 which lays out the scope of cooperation.

To ensure that India’s strategic weapons programme is not affected by this pact, it is clearly stated that the agreement will be implemented in a manner “so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material.” This includes military facilities which, officials say, essentially removes all doubt.

The one negative for India is that sensitive nuclear technology relating to heavy water production and other major critical components including dual-use items that can be used for enrichment and reprocessing cannot be transferred under this pact. The agreement says this can only be done through an amendment.

While this is seen as a slight setback among nuclear scientists, the agreement would pave the way for India to explore such possibilities with other supplier nations. Moreover, US as a matter of policy, largely does not supply this technology to any country including nuclear weapon states.

Once upon a time in 1998...

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