The underlying factors complicating our relations have not changed for the better with recent developments; some have changed for the worse. Earlier, the Maoists were handy instruments of the palace; now they are their own masters. Negative approaches towards India can therefore be pursued with more conviction and less opportunism. The palace was acting out of a sense of vulnerability; the Maoists will act with the confidence of popular backing. The China factor could backstop even more strongly the policies of the new dispensation in Nepal. China too may want to further increase its influence in Nepal to control better Tibetan elements there following the failure of its policies in Tibet.

Prachanda’s statement that Nepal will maintain equidistance from India and China means pursuing a policy that has precluded a normal relationship with India that would recognise the compulsions of geography, economics, culture, religion and, indeed, enlightened self-interest. Nepal should have good relations with China; but “equidistance” distorts relations with India as it actually means positioning Nepal much closer to China than to India, given the much more substantial content of its relationship with India than with the other neighbour. It is this flawed concept that has conditioned Nepal’s flawed policies towards India in the past.

Prachanda’s call for renegotiating the 1950 treaty with India — which we do not need to reject — is an expected revival of old agendas of suspicion and mistrust. The open border with Nepal has, in practical terms, more disadvantages than advantages for India. Reversing this historical legacy would be moving in the wrong direction for emotional reasons. Apart from the practical difficulty on both sides of effectively regulating the border, instituting tight border controls and associated regimes will seriously hamper the existing people-to-people relationship that, between any two friendly countries, should be seen as a valuable cementing force.

... contd.