Never again

India has no terrorism strategy. All we have is crisis management, the very antithesis of strategy

This terrorist attack was the worst the country has faced. The worst in terms of locations targeted; of the audacity of the terrorists; the highly coordinated nature of the terrorist operation; the sophistication of the weapons used; the number of casualties; the destruction caused; and of the time taken for resolving the issue. We have learnt little after being targets of terrorist actions over relentless decades. There was a major attack in Delhi just this September; another soon after in Guwahati; and yet, we have again been found napping. Why is it that we seem so helpless? The reason is that we have been unable to get our act together and continue to deal with this major menace in a fractured and uncoordinated manner.

Unfortunately, all that our leadership — not just the political leadership but also the emergency core group of officials — have to offer are platitudes and exhortations to maintain communal harmony and remain calm. These are, of course, vital; but they are not a comprehensive plan that could work to counter such activities. Till date, there is apparently no attempt at planning, although we are, today, the biggest victims of terrorism.

After 9/11, the US administration took many measures to ensure that such attacks did not recur. They set up a structured organisation in the form of the department of homeland security, which served as the nodal agency for command and control, with other agencies reporting to it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating: not one terrorist incident has taken place in mainland America after instituting these measures.

Compare that to India, which has no terrorism strategy. All we have is crisis management, which is indeed the very antithesis of strategy, and thus meaningless. There are too many sources of this strategic confusion: our agencies, clueless as ever; various police forces, activated only when an incident occurs; Centre and states blaming each other, as security is a state subject; a political leadership focussed unwaveringly on the next elections; core officials easily reverting to their earlier dispensations and routine.

As someone who spent a life in the military, the most striking thing about the Mumbai standoff was the chaos visible outside all the venues. No one was apparently in command or co-ordinating the various operations. No communication arrangements were visible: everyone seemed to be communicating only by their mobiles! This is a major threat, akin to war: it is unthinkable that we can expect to succeed in our objective if we proceed in such a lackadaisical manner.

On this occasion the prime minister took the unprecedented step of speaking to the nation. Unfortunately, there was no discernible, concrete, plan revealed. Further strengthening laws is just one small aspect of the actions that need to be taken.

I propose a four-pronged approach. Firstly and most importantly, it is imperative to set up a unified command, fully autonomous and headed by only one person or entity. It must have full powers to act and must be given wherewithal to develop and then execute a comprehensive strategy. It should be allowed an independent chain of command to all states and further down to identified districts, regions and sub-regions. The excuse of security being a state subject must not come in the way; if necessary, the Constitution should be amended.

Story continues below this ad

Secondly we need more relevant and actionable intelligence. This needs a high degree of expertise; technical back-up; recruitment of dedicated individuals who can penetrate terrorist cells; funding; and sharing of information as it is available, not after months of it going round the officials of various intelligence agencies.

Thirdly, immediate strengthening of the police forces, if necessary with help from the army. This must include the revival of the concept of the beat constable, who was always the key source of intelligence. Many excuses are given as to why he is unavailable or ineffective, but if accountability is built-in and enforced and motivation is increased, the beat constable will regain his key position in identifying and reporting illegal activity and suspicious individuals.

Fourthly, we need to look closely at the fundamental reasons for such acts and then make definitive plans to remove the causes or grievances which may be responsible. This squarely falls in the realm of the government and the political parties. In case there is an international angle to it, as seems to be the case, if political and diplomatic actions do not produce results, then it is the duty of the government to take recourse to military action.

None of these is unachievable, provided there is a will, a centralised authority, accountability and an understanding of the magnitude of the task. We are resilient, but we must not be passive.

The writer is a former vice-chief of army staff

expressexpressindia.com