For the government, the main incentive is to take advantage of the global shift towards the economies of Asia. Sri Lanka cannot ride on the wings of India’s economic surge unless it breaks away from the cycle of suicide attacks. A March 2007 suicide bombing saw a Rs 12 billion plunge in the value of the Sri Lankan stock market. For the LTTE, the reverses in the east, deaths of top leaders such as Anton Balasingham, and split with the Karuna faction have taken a toll on its morale. Even though previous attempts have failed, significant devolution backed by international guarantees could function as incentives for LTTE’s cooperation.

With the government holding the military advantage, this is the time for India to lean on the Sri Lankan President Rajapakshe to actively craft a political solution, rather than preparing for a military strike. As former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinge pointed out, an all party group set up in 2006 to discuss a political solution to the crisis has not yet resolved the final draft. This could be the first step. Indian diplomats are already engaged in back-channel communications with Tamil (LTTE and anti-LTTE) and Sinhalese groups. These efforts will help generate a longer term process of reconciliation between Tamil and Sinhalese citizens and create a common Sri Lankan identity.

The writer is fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi