Since the ‘one year’ deadline has gone, the Army commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, has revised the target to one more year to ‘finish the LTTE’. In the past year, however, according to the Army chief, the LTTE has ‘lost the capability to fight as a conventional force’ due to the relentless ‘overall military strategy’. The present strategy of the military is ‘not just go for terrains, but [to] go for the kill’. The Army claims to have killed 9000 Tigers by losing 1700 of its personnel since August 2006. If this strategy is sustained, the Army feels that in a year’s time the Tigers would be reduced to nothing more than a ‘rag-tag terrorist outfit’. The LTTE already has lost key leaders like Tamilselvan to such strategy carried out by ‘deep penetration units’ with incessant air strikes. It is true that the government forces could make advances in the southwest breaching the forward defence lines of the LTTE in the district of Mannar. There are some successes along Vavuniya and Welioya in the south. Overall, about 150 square kms were captured from the LTTE. The plan now is to gradually encircle Kilinochchi, the LTTE’s administrative capital, from all sides.

However, the fact that not much progress is seen at the northern front clearly demonstrates that the LTTE’s conventional capability has not been compromised. The Tigers are perhaps making ‘strategic withdrawal’ in the south, but stiffly guarding the Elephant Pass in the north. As envisaged by the Army chief, even if the LTTE’s conventional capability is reduced, the group would be fighting a ‘different war’. Tigers are already using hit and run tactics in the east and suicide attacks in the south. At the minimum, therefore, a low intensity conflict would continue for some years. Even the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran, by luck, falls, the dynamics of the conflict are not expected to change dramatically. The main challenge for the government, at this juncture, is to sustain the present military push during an economic downslide and amidst international criticism of human rights violations.

Militarily confident, the government is unwilling to resume talks unless the LTTE lays down arms unconditionally. On the other hand, the LTTE will never come to the negotiating table, except when it can dictate terms from an advantageous position. Given these entrenched positions, peace is only a distant dream. Even a ‘hurting stalemate’ would result only in a ceasefire, but not to talks leading to a final settlement. The onus is on the government to sincerely present an acceptable devolution package to the Tamils. The All Party Representative Committee (APRC), formed to ‘fashion creative options that satisfy minimum expectations as well as provide a comprehensive approach to the resolution of the national question’, has not come good. Instead of exploring creative options, the APRC, in its interim report, advised the President to implement the 13th amendment to the Constitution, which outlined devolution to provinces after Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987. Even after 20 years, ideas are back to square one.

However, the government is unwilling to implement even these old ideas. It is appreciable that President Rajapakse conducted elections firstly to local councils in Batticaloa district in March and then to now de-merged Eastern province in May this year. The post-election governance in the east, however, is not promising. This is an opportunity for the government to demonstrate its earnestness over power-sharing with minorities. The opportunity, however, seems to be misused to show to the international community that ‘democracy has been restored in the former fascist areas’. Instead of being a mute spectator, the international community, including India, should involve proactively to seek a political solution to the ethnic question. Why not form a consortium to exert leverage on both antagonists?

The author is Senior Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.