However, the fact that not much progress is seen at the northern front clearly demonstrates that the LTTE’s conventional capability has not been compromised. The Tigers are perhaps making ‘strategic withdrawal’ in the south, but stiffly guarding the Elephant Pass in the north. As envisaged by the Army chief, even if the LTTE’s conventional capability is reduced, the group would be fighting a ‘different war’. Tigers are already using hit and run tactics in the east and suicide attacks in the south. At the minimum, therefore, a low intensity conflict would continue for some years. Even the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran, by luck, falls, the dynamics of the conflict are not expected to change dramatically. The main challenge for the government, at this juncture, is to sustain the present military push during an economic downslide and amidst international criticism of human rights violations.

Militarily confident, the government is unwilling to resume talks unless the LTTE lays down arms unconditionally. On the other hand, the LTTE will never come to the negotiating table, except when it can dictate terms from an advantageous position. Given these entrenched positions, peace is only a distant dream. Even a ‘hurting stalemate’ would result only in a ceasefire, but not to talks leading to a final settlement. The onus is on the government to sincerely present an acceptable devolution package to the Tamils. The All Party Representative Committee (APRC), formed to ‘fashion creative options that satisfy minimum expectations as well as provide a comprehensive approach to the resolution of the national question’, has not come good. Instead of exploring creative options, the APRC, in its interim report, advised the President to implement the 13th amendment to the Constitution, which outlined devolution to provinces after Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987. Even after 20 years, ideas are back to square one.

... contd.