Unlike the ‘hit-and-run’ strategy adopted by Kashmiri militants for years, this attack saw a group of militants sneaking into the highly fortified headquarters of the Deputy Inspector-General of the Border Security Force situated on the Madar hills in the outskirts of Bandipore town. The militants scaled the eastern wall of the camp and ran straight to the residential compound, where they holed themselves up after killing six BSF personnel, including the Deputy-General himself.

The operation to flush out the militants took more than 24 hours, with the paramilitary force needing to call in the special forces of the army (paras). The National Security Guard personnel, too, had to be flown in to take part in the operation.

The militants had just changed the rules of the game.

Out of Oblivion

THE sensational attack was the first in Kashmir to deploy a special cadre of militants who would wilfully go into a suicide assault. The group that blasted its way into the headlines was Lashkar-e-Toiba, a Pakistan-based Jihadi organisation that began putting down roots in Kashmir in 1993.

The Fidayeen (suicide) attack took Lashkar out of the oblivion and put it at the heart of the militant movement in Kashmir, where years of counter-insurgency operations—including the fierce campaign by government-sponsored renegade militants called Ikhwan—had literally broken the resistance of indigenous groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen.

For Lashkar, Bandipore was the sensational signature tune they would repeat in every subsequent operation. Within months, this tactic would alter alter the balance in favour of militants, putting unbelievable pressure on the security forces, who would now find even their fortified camps unsafe.

In fact, between November 3, 1999, and December 31, 2000, Lashkar was involved in 15 out of 19 major suicide strikes in Jammu and Kashmir. Security forces estimate at least 50 personnel were killed in these attacks and another 70 injured. In 2001, Lashkar was responsible for 23 out of 28 fidayeen attacks, killing 83 security force personnel and injuring another 135.

However, it was Lashkar’s first major strike outside J&K—on the Cantonment section of the Red Fort in New Delhi on December, 22, 2000—that transformed it into the region’s most lethal militant group. Though the toll in the strike was relatively low—three armymen died in the incident—it was a major psychological boost for pan-Islamic Jihadi groups for whom the strike over this Mughal fort that had acted as the heart of the Muslim empire in India was a symbolic victory for their goal that transcends the ‘‘right of self-determination’’ of Kashmiris—the main aim of almost all the separatist groups in the state.

Roots of Terror

LASHKAR-e-Toiba (literally, the Army of the Pious) was first launched in 1987 with an aim to participate in the Afghan war. Its militants fought the Russians in the Haji area of Paknea province along with the Afghan mujahideen outfit Itihad-e-Islami. But as the Afghan war was at its fag end, the group did not get win any limelight for its operations against the Russians.

The group soon shifted its attention towards Kashmir and, according to the security agencies in Srinagar, its Valley operations began in 1993. For years, the group stayed below the radar, so much so that government agencies had little clue about its ideology and cadre.

In 1997, United States proscribed Harkatul-Mujahideen—the largest pan-Islamic militant outfit then operating in the Valley—as a foreign terrorist organisation, turning it into a tactical nightmare for the ‘‘Kashmir cause’’ internationally. And as Harkat was slowly marginalised, Lashkar got an opportunity to make its presence felt. They began their strikes, choosing certain pockets of strength i the Valley, and also building bases in the Muslim-dominated districts of Doda, Rajouri, Poonch and the hilly areas of Udhampur in Jammu province.

In fact, Lashkar was set up as the armed wing of the pan-Islamic Markaz-e-Dawat-ul-Irshad, which was launched in 1985 with its headquarters at Murdike near Lahore. Markaz, which had established a network of around 2,200 madrasas across the country, has a clear agenda and ideology. Starting with the complete Islamisation of Pakistan and Kashmir, it hopes Islam will finally dominate the world.

For this, the organisation established the Jamia Dawat-ul-Islam, or the University of Dawat-ul-Islam, in 1989. Located on a four-acre campus, it imparts religious education. According to an essay in the Lashkar mouthpiece Jihad Times, around ‘‘50 of the students of this university have died fighting in Kashmir’’.

The basic ideology of the group states that religion is not the private affair of Muslims and politics cannot be separated from religion. In fact, Markaz rejects democracy as a western concept full of flaws.

Orders & Options

In their November 1997 annual conference, the Markaz’s Amir Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed—a former professor of engineering—clearly articulated the group’s ideology which is against the separation of religion from state. Rejecting democracy, the group’s ideology is based on ‘‘the notion of the sovereignty of the people as un-Islamic because only Allah is sovereign.’’

Sayeed told the congregation that ‘‘God has ordained every Muslim to fight until His rule is established. We have no option but to follow God’s order. We continue to support other Islamic organisations in the world. This is a very long battle.’’

In fact, it is this ideology that makes Lashkar both in it action and aim different from all other militant groups operating in Kashmir. Lashkar’s puritan ideology transcends the separatist aim to achieve ‘‘right of self-determination for Kashmiris’’ and its mission expands to the entire ummah (Muslim world) with Kashmir one of the several battlegrounds in their pan-Islamic struggle.

After the ban on the outfit in Pakistan, Lashkar’s top boss Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed distanced himself from the outfit, replacing himself by a Kashmiri commander. In fact, its parent group Markaz, too, changed its name and set up another organisation called Jamat-ud-Dawa, with an exclusive aim to reform Pakistani society.

Beyond the Blacklist

SOON after the Lashkar began its rise into prominence as the most ‘‘effective’’ and ‘‘well-trained’’ Jihadi outfit operating in J&K with ‘‘increasing capability to expand their operations across India’’, the group was banned by the Centre under the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) on October 25, 2001.

Then the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a notification on December 26, 2001, designated the outfit as a foreign terrorist organisation.

However, the biggest blow to Lashkar came when Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf ordered a ban on it along with four other Islamist groups in January 2002, under severe post-9/11 pressure from the United States and the threat of an Indo-Pak war after the Parliament attack on December 13, 2001.

Till the ban, Lashkar was able to operate openly inside Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new cadre because of its role in the fight in Kashmir. In fact, neither Lashkar nor its parent group Markaz had ever been involved in sectarian violence inside Pakistan.

According to the Herald, a leading Pakistani magazine, the Lashkar would provide two types of military training to its cadre—a 21-day basic course called ‘Daura Aam’ and a three-month advanced course called ‘Daura Khas’. The advanced course prepares the cadre for full-fledged guerrilla war with in-depth training in arms, bomb-making (especially improvised explosive devices), surprise ambushes and also techniques for survival in difficult living conditions.

The Fidayeens—a special group—however, receive ideological training as well, which is generally based on the Islamic belief of ‘‘life after death’’.

Standing Apart

IN fact, Lashkar’s fidayeen or suicide operations, too, are different from all other suicide militancy across the world, be it the LTTE’s Black Tigers, who consume cyanide to avoid being captured alive, or even Islamist groups like the Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, who strap explosives around their bodies or ram an explosive-laden vehicle on the target.

The reason seems to be the clear prohibition against suicide in Islam. Thus Lashkar’s Fidayeen do not go on missions where death is certain, but select assaults where they do have chance, however slim, of returning alive. And Lashkar Fidayeen have managed to escape alive in several such missions, such as the one when one of their cadre, Abu Talha, sneaked into the Army’s 15 Corps headquarters on November 3, 1999, and killed nine army personnel—including Public Relations Officer Major Purshottam—in Badamibagh Cantt.

According to the security agencies, Lashkar is an extremely secretive organisation which takes great care to conceal the real identities of its cadre. Apart from its topmost leadership, everyone is known only through aliases.

The group uses Kuniats, an Arabic pseudonym adopted from the names of Islamic historical heroes, after a trend introduced by Palestinian groups. But unlike Palestinians, Lashkar allots the Kuniats of a slain cadre to the one who takes over his place, thus making it extremely difficult for the security agencies to keep track of its militants and commanders.

STRIKE RATE

Maharashtra police kills three suspected LeT militants during an abortive attempt to storm the RSS headquarters in Nagpur

May 21, 2006

Two LeT militants, in police uniform, storm a Youth Congress rally at Sher-e-Kashmir Park in Srinagar minutes before Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad is scheduled to arrive. Three political activists and two police personnel are killed and 25, including IGP K Rajendra, injured. Police kill both militants

May 1, 2006

Police claim LeT militants kill 22 Hindus at Kulhand and Tharva in Doda district and 13 at Lalon Galla of Udhampur district

March 7, 2006

Hours after serial blasts in a Varanasi temple claim 21, Uttar Pradesh police say suspected LeT militant Salar, alias Doctor, died in an encounter. Six others allegedly involved in temple blasts are arrested on April 4

Militants storm the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) at Bangalore and kill a scientist, Professor Emeritus M C Puri of IIT, New Delhi. LeT is the main suspect

January 7, 2005

Militants of Al-Mansooran, believed to be a front for the LeT, storm the Income Tax office in Barbarshah, Srinagar. A deputy commandant of the BSF, a soldier and one police personnel are killed and four others injured in the attack. One militant is also killed in the attack

June 15, 2004

Gujarat police claim to kill four suspected LeT militants. Police say they planned to assassinate Chief Minister Narendra Modi

July 22, 2003

A three-member suicide squad storms an army camp at Bangti in Akhnoor. Eight security personnel, including a brigadier, are killed and 12 others injured. Police say Al Shuhda Brigade, which claims responsibility, is a front for the Lashkar

November 24, 2002

Militants simultaneously storm two Hindu temples—Raghunath Mandir and Panjbakhtar—in Jammu and kill 13, injure 45. Police kills all four militants, say they belonged to LeT

September 24, 2002

Two suspected LeT men storm the Akshardham temple complex in Gandhinagar. After hours of terror, both are shot dead

May 19, 2002

LeT militants attack a security force camp at Chasana in Udhampur in J&K killing four security personnel

December 13, 2001

Six gunmen, allied to LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed sneak into the Parliament House complex. Though they are unable to make their way to the building, six policemen die

July 15, 2001

Four LeT Fidayeen attack a Security Force base at Shahlal, Kupwara. Five security force personnel were killed and eight others injured in the attack. The LeT fidayeen manage to escape after the attack

April 14, 2001

LeT militants attack an Army base at Lassipora, Kupwara. Six Army personnel are killed and seven others injured in the attack

March 2, 2001

Fifteen security force personnel and two civilians are killed and nine injured when militants ambush a security force patrol at Marha Chatru in Jammu division. Police says Lashkar is responsible

January 16, 2000

A six member LeT squad storm the Srinagar Airport. The Fidayeen kill four security force personnel and two civilians. Six militants are also killed in the attack

December 22, 2000

LeT fidayeen launch an attack within the army garrison at Red Fort in New Delhi. All members of the squad escape after the attack

August 10, 2000

In two quick attacks in Srinagar, a grenade and a car bomb kill 12 Security Force personnel, two civilians and a journalist. Forty-two are injured. Police says LeT is responsible