After trying to stare down Rawalpindi on its links with the dreaded terror network in Afghanistan run by the Haqqani brothers in the last few days,Washington was the one to blink first.
The outgoing Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff,Admiral Mike Mullens explosive declaration that the Haqqani network is a veritable arm of the ISI,provided the United States an opportunity to launch an honest domestic debate about Pakistan and end its tolerance of Rawalpindis support for terror in Afghanisan and India.
As U.S. leaders over the weekend toned down the harsh words of Adm.
Mullen,Washingtons Afghan policy is likely to remain a hostage to Rawalpindi for quite some time to come.
Like the Bush Administration before it,the Obama Administration is finding it hard to change the fundamentals of Washingtons dependence on Pakistan army for the conduct of its Afghan policy.
It might be recalled that barely hours after the September 11,2001 attacks on the United States,the U.S. Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage called Gen. Pervez Musharraf and told him Pakistan will be bombed to stone age,if it did not choose to side with the United States against the al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Since that thundering threat a decade ago,Washington has been unable to summon the political will to challenge the Pakistan armys double dealing in Afghanistan.
Despite mounting evidence from 2004 that Rawalpindi was helping the Taliban regroup and undermine the government in Afghanistan,the Bush Administration refused to confront the Pak army.
Obama came to power promising to hold Pakistan accountable to the massive aid it was receiving from the United States. He threatened to bomb Pakistan if he found terror sanctuaries on its soil.
To be sure,Obama stepped up the drone attacks on Pakistans terror hideouts across the border with Afghanistan and ordered the raid and execution of Osama bin Ladin in Abbottabad. Yet,his Administration is unable to shake off the profound constraints on U.S. policy towards Pakistan.
For one the U.S. needs access to Pakistani territory to operate in Afghanistan. Despite the recent effort to develop alternatives,the supply route from Karachi port is the main logistical support line for U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan.
Two,the U.S. relies on a measure of cooperation from the ISI and access to other sources of intelligence in Pakistan in its war on terror. Three,there is a strong belief in Washington that no political settlement in Afghanistan will work without support from Rawalpindi.
Critics of the Obama Administration,however,argue that even within these strategic constraints,Washington had many tactical levers to press against the Pak army.
Quite clearly,the Obama Administration has no stomach to follow through the logic of Admiral Mullens truth telling on the Pakistan army.
Last week,it seemed that the latest round of wrestling between Washington and Rawalpindi in Afghanistan will be real. With Washington backing down,it is noora khusti or pseudo wrestling once more.