Rumours abounded in the wake of the deal’s announcement two years ago that the French government — possibly former President Jacques Chirac himself — originally proposed the deal to the White House. Even if that were not the case, France was among the first countries to follow the American lead, with a similar civilian nuclear agreement announced during Chirac’s visit to Delhi in February 2006.

More surprisingly, Strobe Talbott, the former US Deputy Secretary of State, revealed that the French entertained the idea of a nuclear agreement with India as far back as 1998 or 1999, not even one year after the Pokhran-II tests which announced India’s intention to become an overt nuclear weapons power. “In addition to portraying themselves as more understanding of India’s security concerns than the Americans, the French dangled the possibility that India might, with French help, become eligible for nuclear assistance of the kind forbidden to non-NPT states,” Talbott wrote in his 2004 book Engaging India.

India’s hesitation at this juncture is of concern not just to the political, military, business and scientific establishments in the United States. The disappointment at India’s unenthusiastic response in Washington and Paris — not to mention Moscow and Canberra — will likely be surpassed only by the near universal bewilderment at India’s inability to see a good deal when it has one.

The writer researches American foreign policy towards South Asia in Washington DC