But the issue is much broader than the nuclear deal. A whole range of issues is stuck. Progress in FTAs and trade liberalisation with Asean, exploiting the slivers of opportunity we have had for pressing an advantage with China and Pakistan, a clear-eyed view of the developments in Sri Lanka or Nepal, or a more constructive role on issues of global importance are all areas where there is more talk than action. India is fast acquiring a reputation that is best captured in a couplet that was once used, perhaps unfairly, for Nehru: nahin ikrar ka alam, nahin inkar ka pehelu. Whatever our substantive differences, it would be disingenuous to deny that the rest of the world does have a sense of Indian policymaking seriously drifting, bereft of leadership and likely to be held hostage to all kinds of uncertainties.

Besides the political vacuum, many observers agree that there is also the serious challenge of what Marshall Bouton called the “soft infrastructure” of foreign policy. This has two components. The first is capacity within government itself. The simple fact is that, as in so many areas of domestic policy, the government is simply unequipped to cater to the demands that are being placed on it. Just the intensity of summits, organisational memberships, conclaves, and negotiations is proving to be beyond the capacity of the state. As anyone who has watched Delhi can sympathise, there is a sense in which parts of government are tremendously overworked, and the best have unbelievable demands placed upon them. Besides the issue of size, there is also the issue of whether government is organised to mobilise the best available knowledge. There is a good deal of respect for some parts of the IFS and IAS. And there is an understanding that you need good administrators to coordinate and shepherd through a negotiation process. But there is also tremendous consternation at the fact that these services have monopolised the representing of India’s interests. As one senior Asian diplomat put it in a recent conference, “I deeply admire the Indian Foreign Service. But they think they are experts on everything: from climate change to energy, from nuclear weapons to trade.” The point was not a reflection on the capabilities of the service; the point was the lack of its ability to draw in from a wider pool that would allow it to think strategically rather than merely diplomatically.

... contd.