Opinion Notes from the Bastar battlefield

But the situation in the so-called liberated zone of the Maoists is drastically different. Most of the Maad area and large swathes of Bijapur and Sukma fall into this category. They not only take advantage of the hilly and forested terrain in these areas,but also of the poor connectivity in terms of both roads and communication. The unemployed youth is mostly with them as jan militia,strategically positioned to warn them by providing information on the movement of security forces and engaging them in fire-fighting as the first and front layer,that is,the base force of the “People’s Liberation Guerilla Army” (PLGA),constituted by the then Maoist outfit,CPI (ML-PW) in December 2000,renamed to CPI (Maoist) in September 2004. Those that don’t support them face their wrath in jan adalats. In such a hostile environment,intelligence outflow has a time lag.

The guerilla dalams of smaller strength have now swelled to platoons and companies. Whereas the first military Maoist company was formed in the Maad area of Dandakaranya in 2004,after an attack on the armoury of the Koraput district in Orissa,the total number of military companies has increased to more than 10,including two in the Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra,which is also part of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee. Though the Maoists’ janatana sarkars (people’s government) in “liberated zones” pay only lip-service to villagers to retain their support,their military formations unleash waves of terror at will. They have now formed two military battalions,each with a strength of not less than 250 armed cadres. During the three month period of their tactical counter offensive campaign from March 15 to June 15,they converge at fewer locations to regroup in larger numbers,conspire and organise attacks on security forces and identified targets. These are the military formations fought by the police and the CAPF on a regular basis.

The Centre and state governments have done reasonably well to strengthen the police. Whereas the state has increased the strength of each affected police station,raised the STF and SIB,and carved out new districts to improve administration,the Centre has liberally sanctioned new India Reserve Battalions and sent the CAPF to assist state forces. Similarly,whereas the state government took the initiative to establish a counter-terrorism and jungle warfare school in Kanker district,the Centre provided financial assistance to set up counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism centres in Maoist-affected states,including four in Chhattisgarh,to strengthen training capabilities and infrastructure. Helicopters have been pressed into service for the evacuation of casualties. But the so-called liberated zones,where security forces are hardly present,are yet to be made motorable and penetrable for mobile connectivity. Perhaps a recently cleared proposal by the department of telecommunication to set up 2,199 mobile towers in Maoist-affected states will bring some relief to such areas. However,special agencies are required to make roads with the help of committed security,as local contractors mostly run away with advance payment under the perceived threat to their lives. Other government departments also need to fill in the administrative vacuum in the state.

Recently,a temporary camp was established by the security forces in the “liberated zone” of the Maoists near Chintagufa to counter their military battalion. Since the camp penetrated the Maoists’ stronghold in order to reassert the government’s writ and demystify the “liberated zone”,Maoists attacked it using high explosive “finned shells” and automatic weapons. The security forces not only retaliated successfully,but also comforted the villagers by organising a medical camp and distributing daily necessities. While the state has made arrangements for PDS,villagers in interior areas have to travel long distances to access it. Medical facilities are a still distant dream. Drill machines hardly visit these areas to explore water. When the state government tries to reach out to these villagers,we learn that they have seen only Maoists and the security forces in their lives. When they speak their mind,they aspire for development and not janatana sarkar. In response to a query on extortion by the Maoists,the local representative said that he could give them their share only when they allowed him to get some development work done in the village.

The Maoists’ military formations can be effectively fought only through the deployment of special forces. The jan-militia needs to be de-engaged to destabilise the PLGA. Connectivity must be improved to increase the operational efficiency and mobility of the forces. It is a war-like situation now,and needs to be similarly dealt with.

The writer is an additional director general of police in Chhattisgarh