One of the more intriguing aspects of the current debate on the Indo-US nuclear agreement — incidentally the term Indo-US nuclear agreement is a misnomer considering that the agreement will finally depend on the amendments to the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines) — is the manner in which India’s strategic future has been hijacked by some retired scientists. The subtitle of one of the main paragraphs in the recent manifesto of these scientists is “Impact on our strategic defence programme.”

Why is this intriguing? The strategic, that is, the nuclear deterrence of a nation is dependent on three factors and sets of actors: First, the political leadership of the country which will determine the nuclear doctrine — the circumstances under which the nuclear weapon will be used, the purpose for which it will be used and the amount of damage or punishment it would inflict in the event of a nuclear use.

Secondly, the military leadership which will be given the task of executing the political decision will have to assess the capabilities of its own means of delivery — the numbers, types, reliability and accuracy — and the adversaries’ capabilities to neutralise its delivery systems. In addition, depending on the nuclear doctrine enunciated by the political leadership — whether the attack will be primarily first or second strike, counter-force or counter-value — the military will estimate the size and number of strategic weapons needed to give effect to the nuclear doctrine.

Finally with the doctrine — determined by the political leadership — in place and estimates of the number and size of the weapons needed — assessed by the military — it will be for the scientific establishment to assess whether the country has the capability to design and fabricate weapons of the size needed by the military and also if the stock of fissile material is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the numbers needed.

... contd.