If the Pakistan army finds that the costs of cross-border terrorism outweigh the benefits of an engagement with India, there would be reasons for it to change its support to cross-border terrorism. The diplomatic challenge for India, then, lies in changing Pakistan’s strategic calculus on cross-border terrorism. No amount of protestation by New Delhi or the Indian strategic community talking to itself about Pakistan’s perfidies can solve the problem. What are the factors that could alter Pakistan’s approach on cross-border terrorism?

One, a collapse of the peace process, in the face of continuing support to cross-border terrorism, would generate some political costs to Pakistan. Islamabad’s western border with Afghanistan is now under pressure, thanks to the confrontation between Afghanistan and NATO troops there, on the one hand, and Pakistan, on the other. It might not be unreasonable to presume that Pakistan would not want to court new military tension with India on its eastern borders.

Two, for the first time since he took charge of Pakistan in a military coup in 1999, Musharraf looks politically weak. As he seeks to remain in power, through a variety of political manoeuvres in 2007, diplomatic gains from the Indian front might be of some value for Musharraf.

Third, Musharraf can rightly claim that he is the first leader since 1972 to get India to negotiate seriously on the J&K question. Would he want to squander that at the precise moment progress is actually being made on the Kashmir dispute?

Fourth, Pakistan already accuses India of supporting insurgency in Balochistan. It should not be impossible for India to develop a real policy of actively supporting Musharraf’s opponents in Pakistan.

... contd.