It appears that at long last the performance of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) might come under the scanner. It was subjected to some scrutiny after the Kargil war and a few reforms were suggested. Not much was done on those recommendations.

Commenting on the DRDO in isolation, without looking at the higher defence management framework within which it is placed, would perhaps lead to incomplete or even flawed deductions. Besides the services headquarters, the ministry of defence has the defence secretary and three other branches run by secretary-level officers. They are the secretaries, defence production, defence finance and defence R&D. Though they are deemed to be equal in status to the defence secretary, it is the defence secretary who wields the greater authority and who plays the pivotal role. Service chiefs and the other secretaries may interact with the defence minister but all coordination and policy formulation is through the defence secretary.

The point being made is that if the DRDO has not delivered for so many years, the blame must also rest with the higher defence and national security management apparatus to include the political leadership and bureaucrats for having been complicit in the DRDO’s failures. The problems of the DRDO begin from here, in that never has it been really held accountable for its breach of commitments. Occasionally, there may have been the odd adverse comment but beyond that the establishment has continually turned a blind eye to the DRDO’s poor performance.

And this takes us to the next question. Why has our higher defence management not reacted more sharply to the delays and cost overruns of DRDO projects? The part answer is, perhaps, its lack of commitment to the capability requirements that the service chiefs project. It may be contended with some conviction that this absence of serious commitment is the crux of the problem.

... contd.