National security demands that the country’s defence forces be of a size and potency that dissuades and deters potential adversaries against adventures like Kargil, or for that matter even the ongoing militancy and terrorism in J&K. The conclusion thus to be drawn is that there must be greater sanctity to the requirements that the defence services project together with accountability of those responsible for implementation of procurement plans.

The issues of self-reliance and indigenous production would acquire a clearer perspective if they were viewed against the backdrop of the capability projections of the three services. Against anticipated budgets, the services put up five-year plans for modernisation, expansion and capability accretion. These are within the framework of the desired service profile to be achieved within 15 years. Once whetted, these profiles must become the collective responsibility of all the departments of the MOD, including defence production and finance. The DRDO then must join the chorus instead of singing a different tune all the time. Having said this, it is also true that there would be slippages.

The difference between good and bad organisations often is that a bad organisation frequently forgets the purpose for which it was created. Having lost sight of why it came into being, its focus gets distorted. This distortion is evident in the DRDO’s workings. Instead of working in concert with the defence forces in ensuring that the services get weapon systems and force multipliers that they need within the desired time frames and without having to compromise on cost and quality, its purpose has been to get more projects, more funds, bigger budgets and grander establishments in the name of indigenous production capability. In its pursuit of self-aggrandisement it has also successfully acquired power and clout over the defence establishment.

... contd.