Today more than three million people, mostly Pashtun, live in seven agencies and six smaller zones, and only 2.7 per cent of them live in urban areas. The per capita income here is much less than the national average, and close to 30 per cent of the land is inaccessible.

The fragile arrangement between the tribal areas and Islamabad was rattled by 9/11. Khurram, Khyber, North and South Waziristan agencies became the first safe havens for fleeing Al-Qaeda leaders. Pakistan withdrew support from Taliban, and deployed thousands of troops. The US provided military and financial support and promised not to attack the tribal areas unilaterally. Soon after, a wide array of military, economic and political strategies were implemented.

From 2002 to 2004, major Al-Qaeda operatives were killed or captured but the Taliban were largely ignored for geostrategic reasons vis-à-vis India. In 2005 it became increasingly evident that the Pakistani military had been asked to win a ruthless counter-insurgency with little experience and much less expertise.

Political reconciliation, the most important long-term goal, and prerequisite for any sustainable military or economic strategy, came a little too late. While local tribes killed or captured foreign terrorists, mostly Chechens and Uzbeks, after the September 2006 tribal accord with Islamabad, American air strikes and the continued presence of Pakistani troops made harmony untenable. The poppy trade provided funds and the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border provided mobility for the Taliban. Moreover, counter-insurgency efforts were stalled by sectarian violence in the Orakzai and Kurram agencies. By November the Pakistani army’s morale had hit an all-time low when more than 300 soldiers deserted or were captured.

... contd.