If you ask South Block, you will hear a note of disappointment. That comes from early evidence of an increased effort at infiltrating militants just before the passes close, something that used to happen routinely until the LoC ceasefire and a broader thaw came into effect almost five years ago. Is the ISI merely taking advantage of the current confusion and a wobbly centre of gravity in the Pakistani power structure, or could it be that Kiyani’s army believes while Musharraf may have given over power to the civilians, it is business as usual on Kashmir, India and the larger foreign policy? The two meetings Kiyani has had with the American brass, one in Kabul and the other aboard USS Abraham Lincoln, are intriguing. Indications from Pakistani media are not really clear. Was he carrying out assignments given to him by his prime minister? Or was he acting in the usual, “business-as-usual” way, reassuring the Americans as his predecessors might have done, at the first sign of a political change?

History does not change course so readily, and old habits do not die so fast. That is why, while from all evidence Kiyani and his army are not dabbling in day-to-day politics now, the jury is still out on whether they have accepted the inevitability of having to allow a “civilianisation” of the real power structure, or if they would rather prefer the creation of another bonsai.

Surely, the political class in Pakistan is not helping its cause. This coalition of blood-enemies was only united because of a common enemy, Musharraf, and once he was gone, they must go their own ways too. It is also true that they are not really to blame for the last election’s split verdict. It was caused by forces beyond their control, and the usual suspects. Musharraf first broke Nawaz’s party and disqualified him from contesting (while he was in exile) and then somebody got rid of Benazir. All this ensured a split verdict which is what he probably wanted. He, however, underestimated the strength of democratic yearning among his people.

... contd.