Air Commodore (retd) Kaiser Tufail was Director of Operations, Pakistan Air Force, at the time of the Kargil war in 1999. His account, published in the Vayu Aerospace and Defence Review magazine, shows how steps taken by Pakistan triggered the conflict. Excerpts

The Planning: As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), the first occasion when I got an opportunity to interact with the Army’s Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Taj (who later became the ISI Chief) called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when did the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) last carry out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed. Rather impressed with the Army’s interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. Next day, Brig Taj again called, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information, including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc.

He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing.

A cautious Air Marshal Zahid Anis (the Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations) decided to check things for himself and despatched Gp Capt Tariq Ashraf, Officer Commanding of

No. 33 Wing at PAF Base, Kamra, to look things over at Skardu and make a report. Within a few days, Gp Capt Tariq (who was also the designated wartime Commander of Skardu Base) had completed his visit, which included his own periodic war-readiness inspection.

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