While he made a detailed report to the DCAS (Ops), he let me in on the Army’s mobilisation and other preparations that he had seen at Skardu. His analysis was that ‘something big is imminent’. Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high as Army Aviation’s Mi-17s were busy moving artillery guns and ammunition to the posts that had been vacated by the Indians during winter season. Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city. Interestingly, Army messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers.

In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs, many weeks before the operation unfolded. After hearing Gp Capt Tariq’s report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Major General Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army’s ongoing ‘review of contingency plans’ required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations and Plans team would be available for discussion.

Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to ‘Kashmir Contingency’. Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz (the Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans) and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the ‘latest situation in Kashmir’ at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, Corps Commander Lt General Mehmud Ahmad entered, clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf, cutting an impressive figure. After exchange of pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing.

... contd.