In the wake of the 18 July joint statement, five impressions were sought to be insinuated into the public mind. First and foremost, there will be parity: the benefits that would accrue to us, the responsibilities that we would undertake would be comparable to the benefits and responsibilities that accrue to the US. The joint statement recorded that the Prime Minister undertook that “India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices, acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US.” On 29 July, 2005, the Prime Minister told Parliament, “We shall undertake the same responsibilities and obligations as...the US.” “India will never accept discrimination.”

Second, we were told that the reference in the statement to India being, like the US, “a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology,” was an implicit recognition of India as a Nuclear Weapons State. The “backgrounder” about the July 18 statement that the PMO circulated on July 29, 2005, stated five times that India would be securing the same rights as Nuclear Weapons States, and that it would be undertaking only responsibilities to which other Nuclear Weapons States were subject. Our purpose in the negotiations, our principal negotiator said, is to be treated at par with Nuclear Weapons States.

Third, India would be negotiating a special safeguards arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This would be “India specific” — the impression sought to be created was that this would be akin to the agreements the IAEA has with Nuclear Weapons States; that, if it was modeled on some standard protocol applicable to non-Nuclear Weapons States, it would be that minus some features and rigours.

... contd.