Suddenly, the situation in Kashmir was reminiscent of the turbulent ’90s. Interestingly, those protesting were not divided by class, ideology or party affiliation: they were just very angry young people. The stone-pelting, slogan-shouting first ranks were formed of young men between 15 and 25. Even larger protests — some of 50,000 people — took place in remote rural areas that had been quiet for years, including in places with a traditionally close relationship with the army.

What happened might be surprising, but not really unexpected. Everyone was positive about the situation on the ground: New Delhi, Pakistan and the state government. The moderate agenda of the Hurriyat and that of the PDP were beginning to overlap; the Congress was obsessed with “development”, and the 2008 polls were expected to provide closure. Moderate separatists had lost much relevance, waiting indefinitely for the invitation to a second round of talks after the big photo-op. The mistake lay in assuming that the declining credibility of the separatist leadership implied a decline in separatist sentiment as well.

While the government had been expecting that the calm would automatically heal the wounds of 18 years, Kashmir was silently waiting for a concrete mechanism to bring closure to its pain. The expose of mass graves in Baramulla and Kupwara had once again strengthened the demand that thousands of families here still need answers and it is the government’s responsibility to make it possible. Two years of a substantial calm had provided the government with enough time to think and come up with a concrete plan to address the demands of justice. This would have provided a base for a real political process on the ground based on a true engagement rather than a game of dialogue, revolving around mutual gimmickry. The only unambiguous aspect of New Delhi’s Kashmir policy has been to delay confronting real problems, and now Islamabad too has taken a similar line. Still, the presence and strength of security forces was never made proportional to the declining graph of violence or the security establishment’s own assessment of the militant presence on the ground.

... contd.