Lalu Prasad’s power built upon this base, much more “radicalised” than for his counterparts in UP. Lalu was careful in taking along the Dalits, and one of his major accomplishments when he was in power was to make sure that Behenji’s influence did not grow in Bihar. His insistence on keeping Paswan on board is part of an effort to dissuade the Dalits in Bihar from seeking a distinct political identity, like they have in UP. His equation adhered to backwards plus Dalits, even when Dalit stirrings here were the favourite subject for PhD theses.

Lohia’s movement (though he was a UP-ite by birth) and later Jayaprakash Narayan’s Sampoorna Kranti grew roots in Bihar more firmly than UP. And Karpoori Thakur, when he became chief minister for the second time in 1977, accepted the recommendations of a state commission that one-fourth of state jobs be reserved for backwards. Whilst there was a violent reaction from forward castes, the decision in many ways prepared the ground for the radicalisation that was to follow.

The crucial difference between the two states is brought out most starkly by the two chief ministers. Whilst Nitish Kumar’s own caste (he is a Kurmi, an intermediate, landed caste) is not central to his appeal, which is broad-based and carefully balanced — between the BJP’s hold on the upper castes and Nitish wooing the extreme backwards — Mayawati’s own identity is a dominant theme. The fact that she is a “Dalit ki beti” has greatly influenced her political identity. One could argue that she is hoping to ride it out and add additional castes to her core support base; but it is open to debate how much support from backwards she can get, if at all. It appears that the backward versus Dalit cleavage will grow in this election — one that is fanned by the Samajwadi Party trying to unite the backwards, Kalyan Singh’s induction being justified on those grounds.

... contd.