Sunday, May 11, 2008 is the 10th anniversary of Pokharan-II. We could have said, on the eve of this anniversary, how things have changed. Things did change. But India is still back to the nuclear-strategic square one. How India managed to slip back to status quo ante is the story of these 10 years. Let’s begin the story with China.

China’s attitude towards India has always been a good indicator of New Delhi’s global strategic clout. China was contemptuous of India as the latter was preparing for its “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1973. A recently declassified letter (March 2, 1973), from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, showcases the utter contempt Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had for the Indian leadership.

Kissinger says, inter alia, “In South Asia, the Chinese believe India remains Moscow’s principal agent; their distrust of New Delhi remains as potent as ever... Chou (Zhou) displayed a particular contempt for the Indians and a personal dislike for Indian leaders. He related several cynical and disdainful anecdotes about Prime Ministers Nehru and Gandhi.... In response, I said that we would go slow in any improvement of relations with New Delhi and would keep the PRC informed.”

Little had changed by the time the Atal Behari Vajpayee government conducted the Shakti series of nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998. The then Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan and the then US secretary of state Madeleine Albright took the lead in drafting Security Council resolution No. 1172. This was aimed at emasculating New Delhi’s nuclear capabilities and, just to make sure the message got through, added the Kashmir issue.

... contd.